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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-3-102(j)(2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES/PRESERVATION 
A. Do provisions of the Utah Enabling Act and Utah Constitution pertaining to 
state school trust lands preclude the application of statutes of limitations when the State 
acting as trustee seeks to recover possession of state school trust lands wrongfully 
diverted from the corpus of the trust? R. at 560-63. 
1. Standard of Review: 
When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from them are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-
prevailing party, here the State. Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc., 116 P.3d 
271 (Utah 2005). "The district court's legal decisions are granted no deference on 
summary judgment and the court reviews them for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann 
Soffe Trust, 100 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2004). 
B. Is this case substantively distinguishable from the holding of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921), involving the 
identical statute of limitations? R. at 560-63; 762-65. 
1. Standard of Review: 
When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from them are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-
prevailing party, here the State. Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc., 116 P.3d 
1 
271 (Utah 2005). "The district court's legal decisions are granted no deference on 
summary judgment and the court reviews them for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann 
Soffe Trust, 100 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2004). 
C. Did the District Court err in entering Summary Judgment for 
Defendants/Appellees on the basis that they held under "color of title" by virtue of the 
1912 patent (which had undisputedly been adjudicated void in 1926) and the subsequent 
tax sale by Carbon County, without first considering the invalidity of thel912 patent and 
the disputed tax sale? R. at 549-54; 1136. 
1. Standard of Review: 
When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from them are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-
prevailing party, here the State. Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc., 116 P.3d 
271 (Utah 2005). "The district court's legal decisions are granted no deference on 
summary judgment and the court reviews them for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann 
Soffe Trust, 100 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2004). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
I. Utah Constitution 
a. Article X, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) There is established a permanent State School Fund which 
shall consist of revenue from the following sources: 
(a) proceeds from the sales of all lands granted by the United 
States to this state for the support of the public elementary 
and secondary schools; 
(b) • • • 
(c) . . . 
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(d) all revenues derived from the use of school trust lands; 
( e ) . . . 
(2) . . . 
(d) The State School Fund shall be guaranteed by the state 
against loss or diversion. 
(3) There is established a Uniform School Fund which shall 
consist of revenue from the following sources: 
(a) interest and dividends from the State School Fund;. . . 
(4) The Uniform School Fund shall be maintained and used for 
the support of the state's public education system as defined in 
Article X, Section 2 of this constitution and apportioned as the 
Legislature shall provide. 
As enacted at statehood, article X, section 5 read: 
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of Congress, 
approved February 21st, 1855, for the establishment of the 
University of Utah, and of all the lands granted by an Act of 
Congress, approved July 16th, 1894, shall constitute permanent 
funds, to be safely invested and held by the State; and the income 
thereof shall be used exclusively for the support and maintenance of 
the different institutions and colleges, respectively, in accordance 
with the requirements and conditions of said Acts of Congress. 
b. Article XX, section 2: 
Lands granted to the State under Sections 6, 8, and 12 of the Utah 
Enabling Act, and other lands which may be added to those lands 
pursuant to those sections through purchase, exchange, or other 
means, are declared to be school and institutional trust lands, held in 
trust by the State for the respective beneficiaries and purposes stated 
in the Enabling Act grants. 
As enacted at statehood, article XX read: 
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter be granted to 
the State by Congress, and all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise, 
from any person or corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, 
are hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of the State; 
and shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as may be 
provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they have 
been or may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired. 
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II. Federal Statutes 
a. Section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act, Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107, 
provides in pertinent part: 
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, sections 
numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-six in every township 
of said proposed State . . . are hereby granted to said State for the 
support of common schools. 
b. Section 10 of the Utah Enabling Act, Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107, 
provides in pertinent part: 
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for educational purposes . . 
. shall constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which only 
shall be expended for the support of said schools, and such land shall 
not be subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any other entry 
under the land laws of the United States, whether surveyed or 
unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for school purposes only. 
c. Act of January 25, 1927, Chapter 57, §1, 44 Stat. 1026 (the "Jones Act"), 
codified as amended at 43 USC § 870 (1956), provides in relevant part: 
Subject to the provisions of subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section, the 
several grants to the States of numbered sections in place for the support or 
in aid of common or public schools be, and they are, extended to embrace 
numbered school sections mineral in character, unless land has been 
granted to and/or selected by and certified or approved, to any such State or 
States as indemnity or in lieu of any land so granted by numbered sections. 
(a) The grant of numbered mineral sections under this section shall be of 
the same effect as prior grants for the numbered nonmineral sections, and 
titles to such numbered mineral sections shall vest in the States at the time 
and in the manner and be subject to all the rights of adverse parties 
recognized by existing law in the grants of numbered nonmineral sections. 
(b) The additional grant made by this section is upon the express 
condition that all sales, grants, deeds, or patents for any of the lands so 
granted shall hereafter be subject to and contain a reservation to the State of 
all the coal and other minerals in the lands so sold, granted, deeded, or 
patented, together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the 
same. The coal and other mineral deposits in such lands not heretofore 
disposed of by the State shall be subject to lease by the State as the State 
legislature may direct, the proceeds and rentals and royalties therefrom to 
be utilized for the support or in aid of the common or public schools: 
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Provided, That any lands or minerals hereafter disposed of contrary to the 
provisions of this section shall be forfeited to the United States by 
appropriate proceedings instituted by the Attorney General for that purpose 
in the United States district court for the district in which the property or 
some part thereof is located. 
III. Utah Statutes 
a. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 provides in pertinent part: 
The state will not sue any person for or in respect to any real 
property, or the issues or profits thereof, by reason of the right or 
title of the state to the same, unless: 
(1) such right or title shall have accrued within seven years before 
any action or other proceeding for the same shall be commenced . . . 
( 2 ) . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to a 640-acre section of state school trust land in 
Carbon County (the "Subject Land"). The State also seeks an accounting of proceeds 
received by the Defendants from their partial disposition of the mineral estate of the 
Subject Land. The Defendants/Appellees are individuals and limited liability companies 
(collectively described herein as the "Mathises"). 
In 1912, the State conveyed the Subject Land to a private corporation, the Carbon 
County Land Company ("CCLC") for nominal consideration. Subsequent investigation 
in the nineteen-teens and -twenties determined that CCLC had obtained this and other 
valuable coal lands from the state school trust by fraud. The United States subsequently 
successfully sued the State to invalidate the State's title to the Subject Land on the basis 
that the lands were of known mineral character at the time of statehood, and thus not 
5 
subject to transfer. With title to the land having never left the United States, the State of 
Utah's sale to CCLC was void ab initio. 
By subsequent federal legislation known as the Jones Act, the United States 
conveyed title to the Subject Land to the State of Utah, effective January 25, 1927. In 
1932, Carbon County purported to sell CCLC's interest in the land for back taxes, and the 
Mathises' predecessor acquired that interest from the County by quitclaim deed in 1938. 
The State learned in 2002 that the Mathises were leasing the lands to a third party for coal 
extraction and subsequently filed this action. 
The substantive question presented to the District Court was whether the State of 
Utah's after-acquired title in the mineral estate of the Subject Land flowed to CCLC - the 
State's patentee under the void 1912 patent - when the State first acquired the land from 
the United States in 1927. The State contends that as a matter of law the void 1912 state 
patent - by law no more than a quitclaim deed - could not support after-acquired 
title/estoppel by deed, and that the Mathises did not have the required privity in any event 
to assert estoppel, given the root of their claims in a tax sale. Without after-acquired title, 
the tax sale upon which the Mathises' claim to title is based was unquestionably void, 
since title to the Subject Land had always been in either the United States or the State, 
and the property was thus exempt from taxation. 
The parties did not dispute relevant facts concerning the original sale of the 
Subject Property, the United States' invalidation of the State's title, the Jones Act, and 
the subsequent Carbon County tax sale. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
District Court declined to rule on the after-acquired title issue, except necessarily by 
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implication (as discussed herein), or the State's claims that the tax sale, which is the 
foundation of the Mathises' claims to title, was void because the land was at all times 
exempt from assessment. Instead, it held that the statute of limitations contained in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-2 (2007) barred the State from maintaining this action. The District 
Court's Final Order and Judgment was entered on November 27, 2007, and this appeal 
followed. 
The State contends that the statute of limitations contained in section 78-12-2 may 
not constitutionally be applied to bar the State from recovering land wrongly diverted 
from the corpus of the state school trust. This argument is based on the decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P.2d 670 (Utah 1921), which 
held that the identical statute of limitations was inapplicable to bar an action by the State 
with respect to school trust lands because such an application of the statute would violate 
the Utah Constitution. The District Court distinguished Van Wagoner based on its legal 
conclusion that the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis in Van Wagoner was limited 
to the facts of that case, which rested upon a claim of adverse possession. In doing so, 
the District Court relied on the admittedly void 1912 patent and the subsequent tax sale; 
the District Court's opinion stated: "Here the State made a conveyance of the property 
issued by patent and the Mathises acted under color of title based on that patent and the 
tax sale that flowed there from for more than 70 years." R. at 1136; Final Order attached 
hereto at Addendum A. 
The State seeks reversal of the District Court's Order and Final Judgment because 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 is not applicable to this action by the State in its capacity as 
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trustee of the trust created by article X, section 5 and article XX, section 2 of the Utah 
Constitution. The State respectfully requests that the case be remanded to the District 
Court with direction to enter judgment quieting title to the Subject Land in the State. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Statehood Grants of School Trust Lands 
Utah achieved statehood in 1896 pursuant to the Utah Enabling Act. Utah 
Enabling Act, Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107, Preamble. In the Utah Enabling Act, 
Congress granted Utah numbered sections 2, 16, 32 and 36 in every surveyed township in 
the State for the support of the new state's public schools. Id. at § 6. Proceeds from 
these school trust lands constitute a permanent school fund, income from which provides 
funding for Utah's K-12 public schools. Id. at § 10; Utah Const., article X, § 5 (2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-16-101.5(5)(a) (2003). The Utah Constitution declares all lands 
granted under Section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act for the support of public education to 
be held in trust for the purposes for which granted. Utah Const, art. XX, § 2. The Utah 
Enabling Act and Constitution impose a trust upon the State of Utah with respect to the 
disposition of proceeds from the school trust lands as well as the use of the lands 
themselves. National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 869 
P.2d 909 (Utah 1993). The Utah legislature has codified the State's trust responsibilities 
with respect to school trust lands in the School and Institutional Trust Lands Management 
Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 53C-1-101 et seq. (2008) (the "Trust Lands Management Act"). 
8 
The Subject Land 
The Subject Land is a 640-acre parcel of land in Carbon County, Utah, described 
as follows: 
Township 12 South Range 10 East, SLB&M 
Section 36: All 
Appellees Rex Morrell Mathis, Joanne L. Mathis-Ross, William Dale Mathis, 
Mark Pickup, Shawnda Pickup Cave, Mathis Land, Inc., a Utah Corporation, Buck 
Creek, LLC, a Utah Limited Liability Company, Mountain Mineral Resources, LLC, a 
Utah Limited Liability Company and John Does 1-10 (collectively the "Mathises") all 
claim title to the Subject Land. The Mathises' claim to title in the Subject Land 
originates solely from a quitclaim deed from Carbon County to Rex Mathis dated May 3, 
1938. Deed at R. at 131; see also Def.'s Op. Mem, xi; R. at 602-603. 
The 1905 Sale of the Subject Land 
Because the Subject Land was Section 36 of a surveyed township, the State 
originally treated the Subject Land as school trust land granted in place by Congress at 
the time of statehood pursuant to Section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act. On or about 
February 1, 1905, Clarence B. Milner ("Milner") executed an agreement to purchase the 
Subject Land and certain other lands from the State of Utah pursuant to State of Utah 
Certificate of Sale No. 8500 (the "Certificate of Sale"), which he later assigned to the 
Carbon County Land Company ("CCLC"). R. at 19; 599. Pursuant to the Certificate of 
Sale, Milner agreed to pay the State the then-standard price of $1.50 per acre for the 
Subject Land, as non-mineral grazing lands. R. at 19; 798 (noting, "The price paid by the 
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Milners . . . was $1.50 per acre, the value placed upon grazing lands"). On February 28, 
1912, the State of Utah conveyed, without warranty or reservation of any kind, the 
Subject Land to CCLC. R. at 21. A federal court later ruled that CCLC and its agents 
engaged in "a scheme or conspiracy. . . to fraudulently obtain the ownership" of state 
trust lands containing coal resources. Milner v. United States, 228 F. 431, 439 (8th Cir. 
1915). In a challenge to the 1915 Milner decision, the Milners filed a later action sub 
nom Independent Coal & Coke Co. v. U.S., 21A U.S. 640 (1927), in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court concluded that "none of the defendants [CCLC and Milners]... could by 
any legal device, however ingenious, acquire title from the state free from the taint of 
their fraud." 274 U.S. at 646-47. A 1920 special investigation (the "Mainor & Conniff 
Audit") conducted on behalf of then-Governor Simon Bamberger determined that the 
Subject Land was one of several properties containing valuable coal resources that had 
been obtained from the state school trust by means of fraud perpetrated by CCLC. R. at 
871. A second audit (the "Olson Audit") concluded that the CCLC's fraudulent 
acquisition of approximately 5500 acres of land at $1.50 per acre amounted to an 
"ostensibly a sale of cheap grazing lands" by taking advantage of "at least great 
carelessness on the part of the State Land Board in disposing of these lands [referring to 
83,887 acres of school trust lands fraudulently acquired by 'dummy' entrymen and 
assigned to coal companies]". R. at 798, 792. 
The 1912 Patent Declared Void Ab Initio 
As enacted, the Utah Enabling Act's school section grant did not contain an 
express exception or reservation of mineral lands from the grant. However, the United 
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States Supreme Court subsequently held in United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563 (1918), 
that the Utah Enabling Act did not in fact pass title to the State to lands that were known 
to be mineral in character at the time of statehood. In the aftermath of the Sweet decision 
and the Milner court's finding of persistent land fraud, the United States Department of 
the Interior ("DOI"), on June 27, 1924, through the United States General Land Office 
(the "United States GLO") directed the Utah General Land Office Register (the "Utah 
GLO"), a local administrative arm of the federal agency, to initiate contest proceedings 
against the State and its transferees with respect to the Subject Land on the basis that it 
was in fact of known mineral character at statehood. R. at 23-27. After hearings before 
the Utah GLO in which the State of Utah and CCLC participated, the DOI on September 
4, 1926 recommended to the Secretary of the Interior that the claims made by the State 
and its transferee, CCLC, be denied because the Subject Land had been of known mineral 
character at the time of statehood. R. at 40. On September 8, 1926, the Secretary of the 
Interior issued a Final Order adopting the DOFs recommendation, adjudicating the 
Subject Land to be of known mineral character at the time of Utah statehood. The 
Secretary therefore found that the State's title to the Subject Land was void ab initio, 
having remained at all times with the United States rather than vesting with the State. R. 
at 461-62. This order adjudicating the State and CCLC's title to be void ab initio was 
never appealed and became final. R. at 461. CCLC did not pay property taxes on the 
Subject Land subsequent to the Secretary of Interior's Order. See 1932 Tax Deed, R. at 
127. 
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The Jones Act 
In January of 1927, Congress made a conditional grant to the public land states of 
additional lands. The new grant consisted of in place school sections that were known to 
be mineral in character at the time of statehood, and which had thus not passed under the 
original statehood grants. Act of January 25, 1927, Ch. 57 §1, 44 Stat. 1026, codified as 
amended in 43 USC § 870-871 (the "Jones Act"). The Jones Act conveyed as an 
additional conditional grant both the surface and mineral estate of the Subject Land to the 
State of Utah, conditioned upon the perpetual retention of the mineral estate by the State. 
Department of the Interior, Instructions (Circular No. 1114) March 15, 1927. R. at 464; 
see Jensen v. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32 (Utah 1982). On July 1, 1929, the United States 
GLO transmitted a letter to the Utah GLO Register confirming that title to the Subject 
Land had not passed under the Act of July 16, 1894 (the statehood grant) but had passed 
to the State under the Act of January 25, 1927 (the Jones Act). R. at 117-20. In 1964 the 
United States issued United States patent No. 43-65-0072 confirming that ownership of 
the Subject Land passed from the United States to the State of Utah pursuant to the Jones 
Act as of January 25, 1927. R. at 121-22. This patent was recorded in the real property 
records of Carbon County on November 2, 1964 in Book 92, Page 206. 
The After-Acquired Title Inquiry 
By letter dated July 17, 1929, to the DOI, the Executive Secretary of the Utah 
State Land Board inquired what the effect Utah's after-acquired title statute, Section 4879 
of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, had on subsection (b) of the Jones Act. R. at 660-
62. On January 15, 1930, Mr. John F. Edwards, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, 
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responded to the State Land Board's letter on behalf of the DOI to J.F. Mendenhall, 
Executive Secretary, State Land Board (the "Edwards Letter"). R. at 773-77. The 
Edwards Letter stated: 
[W]here title did in fact pass from the State by virtue of its prior patent, 
which would only be in instances where the lands involved passed to the 
State under its original grant, the act of January 25, 1927, does not affect 
such lands and sales and conveyances of the same. This would be true 
under long settled rules of the Department as to lands in fact mineral in 
character, which had been sold and patented as lands passing under the 
original grant, if the lands were not known to be mineral at the time they 
were identified by survey, or at the time when the State was admitted to the 
Union, if the survey preceded the admission. 
Edwards Letter at 2; R. at 774 (emphasis added). It continued: "As to lands, however, 
that in fact were known to be mineral in character at the date the State's rights would 
have otherwise attached, and which by reason of such knowledge did not pass under the 
original grant, the lands pass to the State only by virtue of the act of January 25, 1927, 
and the purchasers thereof obtained nothing by their purchases prior to the act" Id. 
(emphasis added). The Department further stated that the Jones Act "makes no exception 
from the operation of its provisions lands theretofore sold, conveyed or patented by the 
State, and certainly there is no room for the construction that it validated the 
unauthorized prior sale of known mineral lands" and that the State "by legislation or 
otherwise has not power to alienate its title to mineral deposits or consider its previous 
conveyances of such minerals as alienations." Edwards Letter at 3; R. at 775 (emphasis 
added). 
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The Mathises' Claim of Title 
Prior to January 25, 1927 (the date of the Jones Act), title to the Subject Land was 
vested in the United States. Following the Jones Act, title to the Subject Land was vested 
in the State. Neither the United States nor the State was subject to property taxation 
pursuant to then-applicable provisions of the Utah Constitution. See Utah Const, art. Ill 
(enacted 1895). 
On December 21, 1927, the Carbon County Treasurer issued a Certificate of Sale 
making a preliminary sale of the Subject Land to Carbon County for unpaid taxes for the 
year 1927. See 1932 Auditor's Tax Deed; R. at 307. In May of 1932, the Carbon County 
Treasurer issued an auditor's tax deed (the "Tax Deed") to Carbon County, thereby 
purporting to make a sale of the Subject Land to the County for unpaid property taxes 
assessed in 1927. R. at 306. In 1938, Carbon County quit claimed its interest in the 
Subject Land to Mr. Rex Mathis. This quitclaim deed (the "1938 Quitclaim Deed") was 
recorded in the Official Records of Carbon County, Utah on May 3, 1938 in Book 3S, 
Page 616. R. at 478. The Mathises in this case are the successors in interest to Mr. 
Mathis, who died intestate on July 12, 1972. 
Subsequent Events 
Since the date of the Jones Act, the State has made no conveyance of any interest 
in any part of the Subject Land save a mineral lease issued to Andalex Resources, Inc. 
("Andalex") on March 1, 2004. R. at 480-98. Effective as of January 1, 1998, the 
Mathises entered into a lease for the mining of coal underlying the Subject Land to 
Andalex Resources, Inc. (the "Mathis-Andalex Lease"). R. at 500-524. The Mathises 
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did not occupy the mineral estate until they entered into the Andalex Lease. Pursuant to 
the Mathis-Andalex Lease, Andalex has made payments to the Mathises constituting 
lease rental payments, lease bonus payments and advance minimum royalties that 
constitute proceeds from the Subject Land. R. at 500-524. The State became aware of 
the Andalex Lease in late 2002, and filed this action in April 2005 after conducting due 
diligence concerning its potential claim to the Subject Land. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Statutes of Limitations May Not Be Applied to Prevent Recovery of School Trust 
Lands for the Corpus of the School Trust. 
The Utah Enabling Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 107, together with Article X, section 5 
and article XX, section 2 of the Utah Constitution, created an express trust governing the 
management of lands granted by Congress to Utah at statehood for the support of public 
education. This trust imposes a "sacred obligation" on the State of Utah to devote the 
school trust lands to the purposes for which they were granted by Congress. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921), analyzed the 
constitutional scope and nature of this trust and concluded as a matter of law that 
ordinary statutes of limitation - specifically including the exact limitations provision at 
issue in this case - do not apply to bar actions by the state as to trust lands because the 
Utah Constitution imposes an "absolute limitation upon the power of the state to dispose 
of such lands, or permit them to be disposed of, except for the purposes for which they 
were granted by Congress." 199 P. at 675, 679. Courts in other states that have 
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considered this issue have similarly held that the legislature may not statutorily abrogate 
the trust or unlawfully divert its assets. 
The Court has reaffirmed this principle time and again since Van Wagoner, most 
recently in Consolidation Coal Co v. Utah Division of State Lands, 886 P.2d 514 (Utah 
1994). There, the Court held that the school trust imposed an absolute limitation on the 
State's ability to alter or abrogate its duty to receive "full value" for trust lands, or to 
make any disposition of property that conflicts with this duty. In that case, the Court held 
that "serious questions" would arise about the constitutionality of a state statute - in that 
case the statutory contract interest rate - if it were applied to reduce the returns otherwise 
available to the school trust. In the current case, the statute of limitations applied by the 
District Court would wholly divest the school trust of a valuable asset. Under the Utah 
constitution, as interpreted by Van Wagoner and Consolidation Coal, this is not a 
permissible result. 
II. The District Court Wrongly Distinguished Van Wagoner from the 
Current Case. 
The District Court distinguished Van Wagoner on the basis that it involved 
application of limitations to a situation of adverse possession, while it found that the 
Mathises had "color of title" by virtue of the void 1912 patent and the subsequent tax 
sale. This was error for two reasons. First, under Utah law at the time of Van Wagoner, 
the adverse claimant (Whitmore) had color of title by statute, so there was no basis for 
the District Court's distinction. Second, review of the case law pertaining to applicability 
of limitations to the school trust shows no analytical basis for limiting those cases' effect 
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to adverse possession cases; where the issue has been considered, the courts have stated 
that the principle extends to all situations where the trust corpus would otherwise be 
depleted. There was simply no basis in law for the District Court's legal distinctions. 
The Utah Constitution's prohibition of uncompensated loss to the school trust is as 
equally applicable to this case as it was in the Van Wagoner case, in particular since the 
identical statutory limitation language is at issue. 
The District Court also relied upon the Utah Court of Appeals' interpretation of 
legislative intent in Trail Mountain Coal Company v. Division of State Lands & Forestry, 
884 P. 2d 1265 (Utah App. 1994), to apply the statute of limitations in this case. That 
opinion applied statutory analysis to find that the statute of limitations could be applied to 
school trust lands where the legislature has broadly included the state in the statutory 
limitation. However, none of the cases cited by the Court of Appeals as a basis for 
applying the statute to school trust lands actually involved school trust lands - a crucial 
distinction in light of the constitutional issues associated with school trust lands. The 
Court of Appeals opinion did not address or analyze the constitutional limits on the 
legislature's power over school trust lands, but rather relied on a surface application of 
the statute. 
When Trail Mountain was reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari, the State 
failed to raise the constitutional issues in its initial brief. The Supreme Court therefore 
declined to address the constitutional issue on the merits. Trail Mountain Coal Company 
v. Division of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1371, n.l 1 (Utah 1996). This 
decision did not in any way disturb Van Wagoner, which remains controlling precedent 
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here. The District Court's reliance on the Court of Appeals opinion in Trail Mountain 
was therefore error. 
III. The District Court's Reliance on Color of Title and Grant of Summary 
Judgment Implicitly Assumes the Validity of the 1912 Patent and 1932 
Tax Sale. 
Although the District Court specifically declined to rule on the validity of the 
Mathises' claim of title arising from the 1912 State Patent and the 1932 Tax Sale from 
Carbon County, the Court's conclusion that the Mathises had color of title was premised 
upon on the validity of these conveyances to pass title as against the State. This 
underlying premise was flawed as a matter of law. The Department of the Interior issued 
a final, binding decision in 1926 that the United States owned the Subject Land. The 
state, and its prior patentees, owned nothing. This decision was conclusive as to all 
future title actions arising from those parties' interests under the statehood grant. The 
State of Utah subsequently obtained an entirely new title under the Jones Act of 1927, 
subject to the terms of that act. 
The United States undisputedly held title to the Subject Land prior to the Jones 
Act. The State held undisputed legal title thereafter. The assessment of taxes on the 
Subject Land by the county in 1927 could be of no legal effect as to the interests of either 
the federal government or the State of Utah under applicable law exempting federal and 
state land from assessment. Therefore, the sale of the Subject Land by the county for 
taxes assessed while held by either sovereign was void and of no effect as to any interest 
of the state. The District Court's reliance on "color of title" for its legal conclusion that 
the statute of limitations apply in this case is erroneous. The adversely holding party in 
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Van Wagoner also held under color of title. Utah Compiled Laws § 5034 (1917); now 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4(2)(a). Thus, the 1938 Quit Claim Deed from the 
county to the Mathises passed no interest superior to that of the State. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
SECTION 78-12-2 MAY NOT BE APPLIED 
TO THE STATE ACTING IN ITS 
CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF SCHOOL 
TRUST LANDS 
A. Introduction 
The core issue before the Court is whether the 7-year statute of limitations found 
at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21 prevents the State, in its capacity as trustee, from suing to 
recover school trust lands wrongly diverted from the corpus of the school trust. In Van 
Wagoner v. Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921), the Supreme Court held that the statute of 
limitations pled in that case (the language of which is identical to section 78-12-2) could 
not be applied to the State when acting as trustee of school trust lands. In this case, the 
District Court made the legal conclusion that the holding in Van Wagoner did not apply 
and ruled that the State's action was time-barred by section 78-12-2. Final Order 
attached hereto at Addendum A. The District Court's ruling fails to apply the 
1
 This statute has recently been renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-201 with 
amendments not relevant to this case. H.B. 78, § 639, 57th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008). 
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constitutional analysis contained in Van Wagoner and other applicable school trust cases, 
and erroneously distinguishes controlling precedent. 
When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from them are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-
prevailing party, here the State. Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc., 116 P.3d 
271 (Utah 2005). "The district court's legal decisions are granted no deference on 
summary judgment and the court reviews them for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann 
Soffe Trust, 100 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2004). 
B. Utah's School Trust 
When Utah and other western states entered the Union, Congress recognized that 
the vast areas of untaxable federal public lands in the new states created a serious 
impediment to the new states' abilities to support public education through an adequate 
property tax base. State of Utah v. Kleppe, 586 F. 2d 756, 758 (10th Cir. 1978), rev 'd on 
other grounds sub nom. Utah v. Andrus, 446 U.S. 500 (1980). To rectify this burden, 
Congress enacted the federal land grant statutes to create a permanent trust which would 
generate financial aid to support the public school systems of the new states. Id. In 
return for the land grants, the states covenanted to hold the lands under trust covenants 
for the perpetual benefit of the public school systems. Id. 
Utah achieved statehood in 1896 pursuant to the Utah Enabling Act. Utah 
Enabling Act, Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107. In the Utah Enabling Act, Congress 
granted Utah numbered sections 2, 16, 32 and 36 in every surveyed township in the State 
for the support of the new state's public schools. Id. at § 6. Proceeds from these school 
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trust lands constitute a permanent school fund, income from which provides funding for 
Utah's public schools. Id. at § 10; Utah Const., Art. X, § 5 (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 
53A-16-101.5(5)(a) (2003). The Utah Constitution declares all lands granted under 
Section 6 of the Utah Enabling Act for the support of public education to be held in trust 
for the purposes for which granted. Utah Const. Art. XX, § 2. 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Enabling Act grant, coupled 
with the State's acceptance of the terms of the grant through the Utah Constitution, 
created an express trust binding the State in its use of the lands and funds generated from 
the lands. In Duchesne County v. State Tax Commission, 140 P. 2d 335 (Utah 1943), the 
Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he trusteeship of the fund was vested in the state by the Enabling Act as 
a condition of statehood, as a condition to the right of the state to be born, 
and imposed on the state at its birth by the instrument of its creation as a 
condition of its life as a government. 
140 P. 2d at 342. 
The Court in Duchesne County held that the land grant was an express 
constitutional trust, requiring the State to act as a trustee and guarantor against loss. 140 
P. 2d at 337. In National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 
869 P. 2d 909 (1993), the Supreme Court extensively defined the scope and nature of the 
school trust. It concluded that as a trustee, the State was required to act as a fiduciary for 
the benefit of the public education system. 869 P. 2d at 917. The State's fiduciary duties 
included the duty to act only for the benefit of the beneficiaries; the value of school trust 
lands cannot be used to further other legitimate government objectives. Id. This duty of 
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loyalty includes an obligation on the State to not act in the interest of a third party at the 
expense of the trust beneficiaries. Plateau Mining Company v. Division of State Lands & 
Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 728 (Utah 1990). 
C. The Utah Constitution Limits the Legislature's Power to Dispose of Trust 
Lands, Including Disposal by Application of Statutes of Limitations. 
The trust created by the school land grant and the Utah Constitution creates an 
irrevocable duty on the part of the State to receive "full value" from any disposition of its 
school trust lands. Consolidation Coal Company v. Utah Division of State Lands & 
Forestry, 886 P.2d 514 (1994). The trust thus limits the power of the Utah legislature to 
dispose of trust lands for other than full value, including indirectly by limitations. In Van 
Wagoner v. Whitmore, supra, the Supreme Court engaged in constitutional analysis 
considering the application of a statute of limitations substantively identical to the statute 
at issue here: 
Section 6446 (Held Inapplicable in Van 
Wagoner): 
The state will not sue any person for or in 
respect to any real property, or the issues 
or profits thereof, by reason of the right or 
title . . . to the same, unless: 
1. Such right or title shall have accrued 
within seven years before any action or 
other proceeding for the same shall be 
commenced; or, 
2. The state or those from whom it claims 
shall have received the rents and profits 
such real property, or some part thereof, 
within seven years. 
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Utah Code Ann. $ 78-12-2: 
The state will not sue any person for or in 
respect to any real property, or the issues 
or profits thereof, by reason of the right or 
title to the same, unless: 
(1) Such right or title shall have accrued 
within seven years before any action or 
other proceeding for the same shall be 
commenced; or 
(2) The state or those from whom it claims 
shall have received the rents and profits 
such real property, or some part thereof, 
within seven years. 
In Van Wagoner, the State and its patentee (Van Wagoner) sought to eject a third 
party (Whitmore) from school land that Whitmore had adversely occupied and cultivated 
for decades. Whitmore interposed the statute of limitations set forth above. The 
Supreme Court held that, notwithstanding statutory language expressly barring the State 
from bringing an action where it had not been in possession within seven years, the 
statute could not be applied with respect to school trust lands: 
This [the constitutional provisions with respect to school lands] ... is an 
absolute limitation upon the power of the state to dispose of the lands, or 
permit them to be disposed of.... Is it conceivable, in the face of such a 
constitutional provision, that the Legislature could have intended its statutes 
of limitation to apply to such lands? It is our solemn duty to hold that such 
could not have been the legislative intent. When ... we add the further 
provision that the state of Utah guarantees the proceeds of these lands 
against loss or diversion, thus making itself an insurer and in honor bound 
to make good any loss that the schools might sustain by diverting these 
lands, or permitting them to be diverted, to other purposes, the conclusion 
becomes irresistible that the statutes of limitation have no application to the 
land in question. 
199 P. 675, citing Murtaugh v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co, 112 N.W. 860 
(Minn. 1907). 
Courts in other states with school trust lands have similarly concluded that 
otherwise applicable statutes of limitation may not be applied to bar recovery by the 
school trust. In both State v. Peterson, 97 P. 2d 603 (Idaho 1939) and United States v. 
Fenton, 27 F.Supp. 816, 817 (D. Idaho 1939), courts in Idaho ruled that a statute of 
limitations could not be applied to prevent the State of Idaho from foreclosing mortgages 
securing a loan of trust funds. In Peterson, the Idaho Supreme Court looked to 
provisions of the Idaho constitution holding that state's permanent school fund to be 
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forever inviolate to preclude application of the statute of limitations to a state-initiated 
foreclosure. The U.S. District Court contemporaneously held in a similar case that the 
Idaho legislature could not constitutionally enact any statute directly decreasing the 
permanent school fund, and therefore could not enact a statute of limitations that brought 
about the same result: 
The fund is sacred and stands out with that special protection, and any 
statute of limitations, whether it relates to the State or not, would not 
apply to actions brought by the trustee State for the foreclosure of a 
mortgage to secure a loan out of such funds. 
27 F. Supp. at 816 (emphasis added). See also Murtaugh, 112 N.W. 860 (Minn. 1907). 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court has confirmed the constitutional 
limitations placed on the Utah legislature by the school trust in a case directly analogous 
to the one now before the Court. In Consolidation Coal Company v. Utah Division of 
State Lands & Forestry, supra, 886 P.2d at 514, a coal company had substantially 
underpaid royalties to the Division of State Lands and Forestry, which then managed the 
State's school trust lands. The coal lease was silent concerning pre-judgment interest. 
Utah law at that time provided that if the contract did not specify a rate of interest, the 6% 
statutory pre-judgment rate of interest would apply. See Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). 
The Division argued that a much higher interest rate set by Division rules should apply. 
886 P. 2d at 525. It pointed to the fact that, had the royalties been paid on time, the funds 
would have been invested in a trust account at a higher rate of interest, and that charging 
the 6% statutory rate would result in a loss of value to the trust. 
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The Supreme Court agreed. It noted that the State has an irrevocable duty to 
receive "full value" from any disposition of school trust lands, citing cases where courts 
had invalidated legislative action reducing returns to school trusts. Id., citing Kadish v. 
Arizona State LandDep't, 1A1 P.2d 1183, 1196 (Ariz. 1987) (statute fixing flat royalty 
rate on trust lands unconstitutional); Oklahoma Education Ass }n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230, 
236-7 (Okla. 1982) (statute establishing maximum rent on trust lands unconstitutional). 
In light of these principles, the Supreme Court expressed serious questions about the 
constitutionality of applying section 15-1-1 to the school trust: 
Given that the Utah Enabling Act and state and federal constitutions 
"unequivocally demand" that the trust fund be paid the full value of any 
minerals transferred from it, we have serious doubts that the application of 
15-1-1 in this case would withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
886 P. 2d at 527. 
The Supreme Court noted its fundamental rule that it would seek to construe 
statutes to avoid running afoul of constitutional prohibitions. Id., citing State v. Wood, 
648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982); State v. Bell, 785 P. 2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989). It ruled that 
the Division and its governing Board had statutory authority to enact rules imposing 
interest on unpaid obligations, and determined to harmonize those rules with the 
constitutional provisions governing school trust lands. Id. 
D. The District Court Erred in Failing to Consider Constitutional Limits 
on the Applicability of the Statute of Limitations in the Case Before It 
The District Court committed error by not analyzing the constitutional protections 
afforded the school trust and assessing whether the challenged statute abrogates the 
state's duty as trustee. R. at 1136; Final Order attached hereto at Addendum A. This 
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analysis is required by Van Wagoner, 199 P. 670, which holds that the Utah Constitution 
is an "absolute limitation" against which a challenged statute must be measured. 199 P. 
at 675-76. See also Consolidation Coal Company, supra, 886 P. 2d at 525; Montanans 
for Responsible Use of the School Trust v. State, 989 P. 2d 800, 803 (Mont. 1999) 
(constitutional provisions with respect to school trust lands are limitations on the power 
of the legislature to dispose of lands); State v. Tanner, 102 N.W. 235 (Neb. 1905)(it is not 
within the legislature's power to allow uncompensated transfer of trust assets). 
Application of the statute of limitations here would preclude the State, in its 
capacity as trustee, from recovering a valuable asset wrongly divested from the school 
trust through the void tax sale conducted by Carbon County in 1932. It is not relevant 
that the mechanism for this deprivation is indirect, through limitations, rather than a 
direct legislative gift of trust assets. It is equally impermissible in the trust context to 
"allow that to be done by indirection which could not be done directly." Peterson, 97 
P.2d at 607 (quoting Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Townsend, 190 U.S. 267 (1903)). 
As in Consolidation Coal, application of a statute of general application - in that case the 
prejudgment interest statute, here limitations - to the school trust would create a serious 
constitutional issue. 886 P.2d at 527. The Supreme Court in Consolidation Coal stated 
that the Court's construction of statutes, if possible, should avoid the risk of running afoul 
of constitutional prohibitions. Id. Allowing the State to proceed with this action would 
eliminate the risk, indeed the certainty, of such a constitutional problem here. In light of 
the constitutional obligations of the State with respect to school trust lands, section 78-
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12-2 must be construed as inapplicable to actions to recover such lands for the corpus of 
the trust. The Van Wagoner court addressed this issue directly: 
We do not contend that the state of Utah has not consented to a bar against 
the state in some matters, but we do contend that the lands involved in this 
controversy, being school lands, are not within the class of property as to 
which the state has consented to be barred, or consented to any title being 
acquired by adverse possession. At first blush, section 6646 et seq. might 
seem to justify an assumption that the state is barred as to all real property, 
but we contend that the nature and purpose of the school grant from the 
United States, the wording and spirit of the acceptance of the grant in the 
state constitution, the legislative provisions to carry out and utilize the grant 
for the purpose for which it was granted, the necessary incidents of this 
trust, and the beneficent result of a faithful performance of the trust, are 
such that to permit a construction of said sections 6446 et seq., taking away 
the substance of the grant, despoiling the school fund, would be an utter 
violation of the terms of the trust imposed by the donor and of the solemn 
conditions specified in the acceptance of the grant. 
199 P. at 672. The Supreme Court subsequently concluded: "Is it conceivable, in the 
face of such a constitutional provision, that the Legislature could have intended its 
statutes of limitation to apply to such lands?" Id. at 675. Its answer was, of course, no. 
In holding that section 78-12-2 applies to the state in this case, the District Court 
failed entirely to address the constitutional issues raised by the State. Its failure to 
consider constraints on the application of statutes of limitations to deprive the school trust 
of lands was erroneous. 
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II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT WRONGLY 
DISTINGUISHED THIS CASE 
FROM VAN WAGONER 
A. The District Court Ruling. 
The District Court determined that Van Wagoner was distinguishable from the 
case before it. The Court stated that, unlike the adverse possession situation in Van 
Wagoner, here the State had "made a conveyance of the property at issue by patent and 
the defendants acted under color of title based on that patent and the tax sale that flowed 
there from, for more than 70 years." R. 1136; Final Order attached hereto at Addendum 
A. The District Court relied on Trail Mountain v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 
921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996), in which the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals applying section 78-12-2 to a claim asserted by the State for 
collection of coal royalties. The Court of Appeals' decision held as a matter of statutory 
interpretation that states are generally exempt from statutes of limitation in their capacity 
of school land trustees except where the legislature makes the statute applicable to the 
state. R. 1126, citing Trail Mountain Coal Company v. Utah Div. of State Lands & 
Forestry, 884 P. 2d 1265, 1271 (Utah App. 1994). This holding was based on only the 
Court of Appeals statutory interpretation, and did not analyze the constitutional issue. 
B. The Court of Appeals Opinion in Trail Mountain Is Based On an Erroneous 
Interpretation of Case Law. 
In Trail Mountain, the State was seeking to recover underpayment of coal 
royalties from school trust lands under lease. The District Court, relying on Van 
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Wagoner, held that no statute of limitations constrained the State's efforts to collect 
royalties from past years. The Court of Appeals disagreed. Although it noted the general 
exemption from limitations for states acting in their capacity as school land trustee - and 
cited Van Wagoner - it held that where the legislature had specified that the limitations 
period was applicable to the state, it could be applied to the Division's efforts. 884 P. 2d 
at 1271. The Court of Appeals held that the statute on its face applied to the State, and 
concluded it was applicable in the case before it. The Court of Appeals' holding relied 
on three cases: California State Lands Comm 'n v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. 
Cal. 1981); Laramie County Sch. Dist v. Muir, 808 P. 2d 797, 800-01 (Wyo. 1991); and 
State ex rel Cartwright v. Tidmore, 614 P. 2d 14 (Okla. 1983). 
Each of the cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in Trail Mountain do stand 
for the general proposition that the state may subject itself to the statute of limitations, 
notwithstanding the common law rule that time would not run against the sovereign. 
However, none of the cases address or analyze the constitutional limits on the 
legislature's ability to subject the State's school trust lands to a statute of limitations. 
None of the three cases involves school trust lands or the constitutional issues associated 
with those lands. The California State Lands case involved tidelands, which pass 
incidentally to states at statehood rather than through the "solemn compact" associated 
with school trust lands, and for which entirely different rules of law apply. See National 
Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, supra, 869 P. 2d at 919. 
Laramie County and Cartwright did not involve lands at all; the former was a 
construction defect case brought by a school district, while the latter was a state 
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procurement case. The Court of Appeals did not analyze the distinction between claims 
involving trust lands - where the legislature's power is constitutionally constrained - and 
general government claims involving non-trust lands or other issues where no such 
constraints exist. As discussed in Part I above, state constitutional provisions place 
substantive limits on the legislature's ability to act with respect to school trust lands. The 
Court of Appeals opinion did not address these limits at all, relying instead solely on the 
statutory language. Cf. United States v. Fenton, supra, 27 F. Supp. at 816 ("The fund is 
sacred and stands out with that special protection, and any statute of limitations, whether 
it relates to the State or not, would not apply") (emphasis added). Having failed to 
address the critical constitutional issue at all, the Court of Appeals opinion is not on point 
and of questionable precedential value to the issue in this case. 
C. The Supreme Court in Trail Mountain Did Not Address the Constitutional Issue 
On certiorari from the Court of Appeals in Trail Mountain, the State of Utah failed 
to raise the constitutional issue of applicability of statutes of limitation to the State in its 
trustee capacity until its reply brief. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals 
on the basis of the State's waiver of this issue, without addressing the merits. Trail 
Mountain Coal Company v. Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P. 2d 1365, 1371, n. 11 
(Utah 1996). 
Even if the Court of Appeals' holding in Trail Mountain was relevant to this case, 
this Court's constitutional analysis in Van Wagoner is the controlling precedent. 
Consolidation Coal Co., 886 P.2d 514, n.4 ("This Court follows its own precedents . . . 
and is not bound by decisions of the court of appeals") (emphasis in original); Renn v. 
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Utah State Board of Pardons, 904 P. 2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995). This Court's affirmation 
of the Court of Appeals in Trail Mountain did not question, distinguish or overrule Van 
Wagoner. The Supreme Court has continued to cite the case in support of school trust 
principles in others of the line of coal royalty cases that include Trail Mountain. See 
Plateau Mining Co., supra, 802 P. 2d at 729. Van Wagoner remains the controlling 
precedent for this case. 
D. Neither the Nature of the Case Nor "Color of Title9' Distinguishes the Current 
Case from Van Wagoner. 
The District Court distinguished Van Wagoner on the basis that: "The cases cited 
in Van Wagoner are all adverse possession cases." R. at 1130, pp. 7, 36-37; Hearing 
Transcript attached hereto at Addendum B; R. at 1136; Final Order attached hereto at 
Addendum A. The District Court also held that the defendants had "color of title" by 
virtue of the void 1912 patent and subsequent tax sale, thereby holding that this case was 
distinguishable from a case of adverse possession. The District Court's legal conclusion 
and holding was therefore in error, because there is no legal relevance to either adverse 
possession or color of title in the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis and holding in 
Van Wagoner. 
The Peterson and Fenton decisions from Idaho discussed above illustrate that the 
constitutional analysis of statutes of limitation in Van Wagoner applies with equal force 
to fact patterns aside from adverse possession. Both the Idaho decisions addressed 
whether a statute of limitations otherwise applicable to the state applies when the state 
trust attempts to collect on mortgage liens. The Peterson court, in holding the statute of 
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limitations inapplicable to Idaho's school trust lands, found the reasoning in Murtaugh, 
an adverse possession case, applied with equal force in the mortgage lien context: 
The underlying reasons of the above holdings, i.e. the existence of the trust 
relationship and the necessity for the preservation intact of the public 
school funds makes such theories just as cogent, applicable and forceful in 
holding the statute of limitations does not apply to a foreclosure action as to 
bar adverse possession. 
97 P.2d at 607. 
The District Court also distinguished Van Wagoner because it concluded that the 
defendant in that case had "really no colorable right to the property, other than simply 
coming onto the property, fencing it off, raising crops . . . There is no color of title" R. 
at 1130, p. 7 (emphasis added); Hearing Transcript attached hereto at Addendum B. The 
District Court's determination that color of title was legally relevant to its holding was 
erroneous. At the time of the Van Wagoner decision, Utah law provided that anyone who 
had occupied a tract of land for five or more years was deemed to have color of title. 
Utah Compiled Laws § 5034 (1917). This provision has remained unchanged since; it is 
now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4(2)(a). Occupation need not amount to adverse 
possession to qualify as color of title. See id. The defendant in Van Wagoner had 
occupied the subject lands for many decades, and so by definition did possess color of 
title. Color of title does not provide a basis for distinguishing the Mathises' occupancy, 
which is based upon the void 1912 patent, followed by an equally void tax sale, from the 
adverse possessor in Van Wagoner. 
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III. 
The District Court's Application of Section 78-12-2 
Presumes the Validity of the 1912 Patent and 1932 Tax Sale. 
In order to find the statute of limitations applicable, the District Court assumed the 
validity of the Mathises' title, determining that they held "under color of title." R at 1130 
and R 1136. The District Court's reliance upon the presence of colorable title in this case 
to distinguish it from Van Wagoner and to quiet title in the Mathises necessarily assumes 
the validity of the 1912 State patent and the validity of the 1927 Carbon County tax 
assessment to support the 1938 Quit Claim deed from the County to the Mathises. Both 
the patent and the tax sale, as a matter of law, are void, and the Mathises gained no title 
from either. See Huntington City v. C W. Peterson, 518 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1974). The 
Mathises' claim to the disputed property stems from a 1938 Quit Claim Deed, which in 
turn is based on Carbon County's 1932 tax sale of a parcel of property assessed for taxes 
in 1927. 
By final action taken by the Department of Interior, the State's 1912 patent was 
adjudicated void ab initio by the Secretary of the Interior on September 8, 1926. The 
1926 invalidation of the 1912 patent is res judicata and remains binding. The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in State v. Bradley Estates, Inc., 223 F.2d 129, 131 
(10th Cir. 1955) that as a matter of federal law the prior departmental adjudication of the 
mineral character of lands at and prior to the date of official survey is, in the absence of 
fraud in the imposition, conclusive in future title actions. See also Cameron v. United 
States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920). The final 1926 adjudication voided the entire 1912 
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conveyance because title had never left the federal government and the state had no title 
to pass. 
The 1927 Jones Act, Act of Jan. 25, 1927, ch. 57 § 1, 44 Stat. 1026, codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 870-871, was an additional and separate grant to the state of 
known mineral lands. See Jensen v. Dinehart, 645 P.2d 32 (Utah 1982). Thus, in 1927, 
after the Jones Act, the Subject Land was vested in the State as school trust lands, and the 
parcel was thus within the "constitutional exemption from taxation as property of the 
state." Duchesne County, 140 P.2d at 343 (school trust land is "property of the state" 
exempt from taxation); Stowell v. State, 115 P.2d 916 (Utah 1941) (tax deed granted by 
county was without effect as to any interest which constituted school trust property when 
the taxable entity's title failed). If the tax on land for which a tax sale was made is 
invalid, "then the sale is void, and the defendant got no title by her tax deed." Huntington 
Ci(y, 518 P.2d at 1249. 
The Mathises argued below that the doctrine of after-acquired title, codified at 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (2007), applies to the 1912 patent so that the title the state 
received in 1927 immediately passed through to the Carbon County Land Company, the 
state's original 1912 patentees. In order for after-acquired title to apply, the conveyance 
document must contain warranties. Barlow Society v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 723 P.2d 
398, 400 (Utah 1986) (analyzing Utah statute outlining form of quitclaim deed); Dowse v. 
Kammerman, 246 P.2d 881, 882-83 (Utah 1952) (stating proposition that doctrine of 
after-acquired title does not apply to quitclaim deeds is "universally recognized"); 
Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 186 P.2d 965 (Utah 1947). State patents, as a matter of 
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"hornbook law/' are quitclaim deeds in nature and contain no warranties. Energy 
Transports Systems v. Union Pacific Ry., 435 F. Supp. 313 (D. Wyo. 1977); Beard v. 
Federy, 70 U.S. (3. Wall.) 478, 491, (1866); Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co. v. City 
of Los Angeles, 217 U.S. 217 (1910) (patent's operation is that of a quitclaim, or, rather, a 
conveyance of such interest as the government may possess); Ellingstadv. Alaska, 979 
P.2d 1000, 1006 (Alaska 1999); Huntington v. Donovan, 192 P. 543, 547 (Cal. 1920) 
(After-acquired title doctrine "does not apply to a government patent"). 
Additionally, after-acquired title requires privity between the original grantees, 
here CLCC, and those asserting after-acquired title, here the Mathises. Kennedy Oil v. 
Lance Oil & Gas Co., 126 P.3d 875, 884 (Wyo. 2006); Cox v. Gutman, 575 S.W.2d 661 
(Tex. App. Ct. 1978). It may not be invoked by a stranger to the original conveyance 
who is claiming through an independent title. General Auto Service Station v. Maniatis, 
765 N.E. 2d 1176, 1184 n. 4 (111. App. 2002). This principle follows from the general 
rule that a party claiming the benefit of an estoppel must show he was induced to change 
his position because of representations in the deed. Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456 So. 2d 
1047, 1057 (Al. 1984). This Court has similarly held that reasonable reliance is a 
necessary element of establishing estoppel by deed. Arnold Industries, Inc. v. Love, 2002 
UT 133 119, 63 P.3d 721. A tax sale breaks privity. Bradham v. United States, 168 F.2d 
905, 907 (10th Cir. 1948) (citing Hussman v. Durham, 165 U.S. 144 (1897)). In 
Hussman, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether those claiming title through a void 
tax sale can assert any estoppel against previous record owners, and concluded such a 
claim cannot stand because the tax sale functions to break privity between the two lines 
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of ownership. 165 U.S. at 149-50. Thus, the Mathises cannot claim after-acquired title, 
even if the doctrine were to apply to a state patent. The Hussman Court noted that "it is 
familiar law that a purchaser of a tax title takes all the chances." Id, at 150. Because the 
1912 patent was voided ab initio in an adjudication that is binding on this state's courts, 
and because the 1932 tax sale could not pass the State's title, because after-acquired title 
does not apply and because the Mathises lack privity to assert the doctrine, the Mathises' 
claim of title against the State fails. The County had no title or interest in the Subject 
Land to devise. 
Although the District Court purported to not reach the validity of either the 1912 
State patent or the 1932 tax sale, its determination to apply section 78-12-2 and grant 
summary judgment quieting title in the Mathises is implicitly based on the validity of 
both of these conveyance documents. Because the 1912 patent and the 1932 tax sale for 
1927 taxes, were void, the Mathises do not have any claim, colorable or otherwise, to a 
title superior to the State's. 
CONCLUSION 
Title to the Subject Land vested in the State of Utah on January 25, 1927, and has 
not been conveyed since that time. The State is entitled to bring this action to recover 
possession of the Subject Land because state statutes of limitation may not 
constitutionally be applied to prevent the State, as trustee, from suing to recover land 
wrongfully diverted from the corpus of the trust created by the Utah Enabling Act and the 
Utah Constitution. The District Court wrongly applied limitations to preclude the State 
from maintaining this action to recover the school trust lands at issue here. 
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The District Court's holding should be reversed, its order vacated, and this action 
remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment quieting title in the State. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, acting by and through the 
SCHOOL & INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
LANDS ADMINISTRATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REX MORRELL MATHIS; JOANN L. 
MATHIS-ROSS; WILLIAM DALE MATHIS; 
MARK PICKUP; SHAWNDA PICKUP 
CAVE; MATHIS LAND, INC, a Utah 
corporation; BUCK CREEK, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; MOUNTAIN 
MINERAL RESOURCES, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; and JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 050700196PR 
Judge Douglas B. Thomas 
This matter came before the court on August 30,2007. at 9:00 a.m., for oral argument on 
cross motions for summary judgment. Thomas A. Mitchell and Erin M. Arnold appeared for the 
plaintiff. Ronald G. Russell and Royce B. Covington appeared for defendants. The court having 
reviewed the record herein and considered the arguments presented by counsel, concludes that 
the plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-12-2, which provides a seven-year limitation period for the state in respect to any real 
property by reason of the right or title of the state to the same. The court is of the opinion that 
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Van Wagoner v, Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921), in 
which the court held the seven-year limitations period is inapplicable to the state in an adverse 
possession case, is distinguishable from the instant case. Here, the state made a conveyance of 
the property at issue by patent and the defendants acted under color of title based on that patent 
and the tax sale that flowed therefrom, for more than 70 years. In Trail Mountain Coal Co. v, 
Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that the seven-year period of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 applied to a claim by the 
state, and affirmed the Utah Court of Appeals' ruling that although "states are generally exempt 
from the applicable statute of limitations when acting in their capacity as school land 
trustees,, . , an exception to the general rule is triggered when the state itself, through its 
legislature, makes the statute of limitation applicable to the state/1 Trail Mountain Coal Co> v. 
Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 884 P.2d 1265, 1271 (Utah App. 1994). The court having 
based its ruling on the statute of limitations does not reach the issue of the validity of the patent 
or the tax sale. Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied. 
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2. Defendants1 motion for summary judgment is granted. 
3. The court hereby grants judgment in favor of defendants on their counterclaim and 
hereby quiets title against the plaintiff to the surface of the following-described real property (the 
"Property") in Mathis Land, Inc. and to the mineral estate of said Property in Buck Creek, LLC, 
as to a one-fourth interest, and Mountain Mineral Resources, LLC, as to a three-fourths interest, 
said Property being located in Carbon County, Utah and more particularly described as: 
All of Section 36, Township 12 South, Range 10 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
4. The defendants are entitled to retain all payments and compensation previously 
received in connection with the Property. 
5. The court further decrees that the defendants are entitled to all proceeds, royalties, 
and other payments with respect to the Property according to their interests as stated in the 
foregoing paragraph 3. The court directs that all funds escrowed in connection with this dispute 
at Chase Bank (account number 000001609120785) and Key Bank (account number 
440781003775) be released in full to the defendants according to their interests as stated in the 
foregoing paragraph 3. 
6. The plaintiffs Amended Complaint and all claims therein are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
7. This Order and Final Judgment resolves all claims and is entered as the final 
judgment in this case. 
3 
DATED this <Tj\h day of ^f\y\r ,2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
M W A a \ 0 v S l 5 ^ r h v > f r ^ 
Honorable Bouglas B. Thomas 
District Court Judge 
Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
1, Esq. of 
PARR WApDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on August 30, 2007) 
3 COURT CLERK: Seventh District Court in Carbon County, 
4 State of Utah is now in session. The Honorable Judge Douglas 
5 8. Thomas presiding. Please be seated. 
6 THE COURT: Good morning, folks. 
7 MR. MITCHELL: Good morning. 
8 MR. RUSSELL: Good morning, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: We are here on the case of State of Utah 
10 vs. Mathis. We have the State being represented today by 
11 attorney Thomas Mitchell and Michelle McConkie; is that 
12 accurate? 
13 MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, Thomas Mitchell and this is 
14 Erin Arnold, who will — 
15 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Arnold. We have Kathis 
16 being represented today by Counsel, I'll let you — 
17 MR. RUSSELL: I'm Ron Russell, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Thank ycu. 
19 MR. RUSSELL: This is my — Royce Covington from my 
20 firm. 
21 THE COURT: All right, thank you. After I missed on 
22 the first set of names on the docket, I wanted to make sure 
23 that I didn't do it twice. So thank you all for being here 
24 today. 
25 The time is set for oral argument on a motion for 
26 summary — cross motions for a summary judgment that have been 
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1 filed in this matter. As I have reviewed the pleadings — and 
2 I have tried to review everything that has been submitted. I 
3 will not pretend to Counsel that I know those documents, as 
4 well as I'm sure you do, there's a number of documents in those 
5 cases. 
6 However, it struck me that there is a threshold issue 
7 that I think probably needs to first be addressed before we 
8 address the issues with respect to the After Acquired Title 
9 Statute, get into the applicability of the Jones Act and the 
10 J effect of the Jones Act, and the amendments. 
11 I Before we get into any of tnat, I think the threshold 
12 issue has to do with the applicability of the statute of 
13 limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-2. 
14 1 would first like to hear argument on that issue from 
15 both sides, 1 have reviewed your arguments and your brief, I 
16 have read the cases that you're each relying on, but I want to 
17 give you an opportunity to more fully set forth your positions 
18 on that issue. 
19 I think that issue needs to be addressed first, 
20 because that issue may be dispositive as to whether or not 
21 I even reach those other issues. So I would appreciate you 
22 arguing those issues first. I'll let the State go first. 
23 MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. If I may approach 
24 the bench? 
25 THE COURT: You may. Thank you. 
26 I MR. MITCHELL: Counsel for the defendants have a copy 
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1 as well. Your Honor, on the statute of limitations question, 
2 if you would turn to tab 6 in the exhibits, It essentially sets 
3 forth for you the applicable statute of limitations today, and 
4 the applicable statute of limitations in VanWagoner; and as you 
5 can see, they are identical. 
6 VanWagoner is directly on point as to these statutes 
7 and as to this plaintiff seeking quite title, "This plaintiff" 
8 being the school trust lands. The lands have been passed to 
9 the State under the Enaoling Act, Act of Congress, and accepted 
10 pursuant to the terms of the Utah Constitution. 
11 As in VanWagoner, this case is identical in that but 
12 for a Constitutional prohibition, there is no question that 
13 this statute of limitations would otherwise be applicable to 
14 bar the risk cause of action if it's a true tax title case. 
15 We, of course, don't agree in the first instance that 
16 it's a true tax title case. We don't agree that it's a true 
17 tax title case because the tax sale, having been brought 
18 against property which was not subject to taxation, it's void, 
19 just as a tax sale of the State Capitol or a tax sale of this 
20 courthouse would be void, and no passage of time would divest 
21 this State or this County of it's courthouse by virtue of an 
22 erroneous or invalid or void sale. 
23 But looking directly at the statute of limitations and 
24 looking directly at the VanWagoner case, the State in that case 
25 stated to the Court, the sole question is, may the Legislature, 
26 by statue of limitations, impose a bar or a barrier to the 
~5
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1 recovery of land v/hich was given in trust, given that the Utah 
2 Constitution Article 20 Section 1, provides that the State 
3 accepts and holds this lane in trust. 
4 If the State — and the State, as part of this promise 
5 in its Constitution, the acceptance of this land, has said 
6 that it will not leave, it you will not allow that; property 
7 of the trust to leave, except for the respective purposes for 
8 which they have been, or may be granted, donated, devised, or 
9 otherwise acquired and; therefore a void tax sale would — 
10 and of course, any tax sale of State property would be void, 
11 because it's not subject to taxation. 
12 That the Court held it is conceivable in the face of 
13 such a — is it — asks the question, is it conceivable in the 
14 face of such a Constitutional provision, that the Legislature 
15 could have intended its statute of limitations to apply such 
16 lands. It is our solemn duty to hold that such could not have 
17 been the Legislative intent, 
18 How, since 1921, the Legislation has never expressed a 
19 contrary opinion. It has simply passed on the same identical 
20 language, and has never in any way attempted to address this 
21 holding to try and reach a different result. 
22 Defense, m this case, place a great deal of weight 
23 on the Trail Mountain case. Tr.e Trail Mountain Case, there 
24 are a couple of important observations in regard to that. In 
25 the first instance, the Ute — the Utah Supreme Court did not 
26 overrule its holding in VanWagoner. 
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1 What it held was, that in the context of what was 
2 J essentially a commercial dispute, i.e. a contract dispute, 
3 I between the trust and the mine company paying the royalties, 
4 that in the absence of the Constitution issue having been 
5 raised in a timely fashion, it would not disturb the lov»;er 
6 Court rule — the Appellate Court ruling. It was toe late to 
7 raise that issue, 
8 If the desire to distinguish or desire to overrule its 
9 clear precedent, it could have done so. The Court does not 
10 overrule clear and unambiguous precedent on a Constitutional 
11 issue without comment, without any reference to the case it's 
12 overruling. 
13 The Appellate Court or the intermediate Court of 
14 Appeals decision has no precedential value as against the 
15 Supreme Court's decision in VanWagoner. So I think Trail 
16 I Canyon — or Trail Mountain does not provide a basis for 
17 ignoring or for applying a different standard where the 
18 Supreme Court has spoken so clearly and unambiguously as to 
19 this particular statute of limitations, as to this particular 
20 type of plaintiff, in this situation of seeking to recover 
21 property, which is being adversely claimed under color of the 
22 tax title (inaudible), as opposed to purely adverse possession; 
23 but again, the elements being more or less the same. 
24 Does the Court have any specific questions on this 
25 issue? 
26 THE COURT: Well, I suppose you just touched on my 
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1 primary question, and that is the differences. I take a look 
2 at the case which you were referring to, the VanWagoner case. 
3 That's an adverse possession case; and the cases that are 
4 cited in VanWagoner are all adverse possession cases, where 
5 essentially there is no claim to the property through deed or 
6 through color of — really no colorable right to the property, 
7 other than simply coming onto the property, fencing it off, 
8 raising crops, ditching it, that type of thing. There is no 
9 color of title. 
10 Ky question has to do 'with isn't that factual situation 
11 different from the facts of this case where we have an original 
12 patent issued in 1912; we then have — I WOP/t go through the 
13 whole analysis, but of course, the Sweet decision, actions by 
14 the Department of Interior, the Jones Act, the Jones Act 
15 Amendment, and then the tax title being issued. That tax 
16 title, that tax deed, being in effect now for close to 70 
17 years, isn't that different from the facts in the VanWagoner 
18 case? 
19 MR. MITCHELL; Well, yeah, they are — the facts are 
20 different in each case, but let me distinguish, if I can. 
21 In this case, the relevant — the relevant act is 
22 the tax sale. What goes on before goes to why it was State 
23 property; why it didn't belong to the Milners and their Carbon 
24 County land scheme; why acts had been taken by the United 
25 States Government; why there had been investigations by the 
26 auditor in the Governor's office to get to the bottom of this 
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— of all this coal crop. 
After that date, after the efforts of the United 
States, after the efforts of State auditors and investigators, 
the title being in the State, then the question arises, could 
a tax sale of property whicn is not subject to taxation, which, 
of course, the State receives no notice of, the State doesn't 
receive notice that its property being sold for back taxes? 
Think, for example, if you think about it, if you look 
at the front — 1 think it's tab No. 3 in your binder — you 
look at the map of the State of Utah, and you look at the blue 
squares, they are somewhere in the neighborhood of "?,000 plus 
individual parcels of land held by the trust. There is not 
only no actual notice to the trust tnat someone is purporting 
to sell its property at a tax sale, there can't even be any 
constructive notice. 
The Supreme Court xn the — in a recent case noted 
that you can't affect the State's property through constructive 
notice when the State has property everywhere, and the State 
holds property pursuant to law. The State doesn't go down when 
it acquires title in its sovereign capacity or in its trust 
capacity, and file — or at least historically did not file. 
In this case, of course, there actually is a 1964 on 
file in the County record cf the State's title; but under those 
circumstances, the relevant time to look at this case is from 
the time there was a void tax sale, ana the holding under that 
void tax sale. 
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Mathis' 
tat there 
for one 
. or 
constructive notice to the Stare. 
If this was purely an equity case, as opposed to a 
statutory case, you might say, laches, because that's really 
the heart of what they're arguing. They're arguing to you 
an equitable argument. They're not arguing to you that the 
statute of limitations can't apply under VanWagoner, because 
VanWagoner is so express as to the fact that the Legislature is 
incapable in its legislative capacity of breaching its trust 
under the Constitution as to these lands. 
Instead, what they're really arguing to you, and I 
think, you know, the appeal to their case is, the passage of 
time. The passage of time. The passage of time in this case, 
your Honor, is a passage of time in which the State had no 
notice of this adverse claim to it. There's nc evidence that 
there was an adverse claim. 
The activity that went on before is the activity of 
trying to disgorge property wrongfully transferred, and get it 
back into the State. The title to the Mathis' claim is from a 
quit claim in the 1930's, an independent root of title, which 
stands and fails on the validity of the tax sale. 
We aren't saying that the tax sale was flawed. 
We're not saying that the tax sale failed to comply with some 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
-10-
technicality. We're saying it was void out an issue, as though 
it never happened, because there was never the power in the 
County to sell State property at a tax sale. 
Because of that, in trutn, setting aside for a moment 
the fact that this statute can't apply to the trust in the 
circumstance, it isn't even applicable, because there was 
no tax sale of the State property. It never happened. The 
documents were without any legal effect. The only a legal 
effect of the quit claim deed was to dispose of any claim the 
County had in the land, and to transfer that, whatever claim 
the County had, to the Mathis'. It did not operate to pass the 
title that they held. 
So, consequently, in the first instance, this statute 
of limitations really isn't applicable. What their argument 
really is, is a laches claim. We've cited in our brief, in 
our open brief, and they have not contested that the passage 
of time, the failure to act of employees of the State, of the 
trust, of the sovereign, can act to divest the State, the 
sovereign, the trust of its properties. Laches will not run 
against the trust by virtue of the passage of time and the 
failure to act in the abstract of State officials. 
Does that help clarify? 
THE COURT: A little bit. I'm a little concerned 
about the notice issue that you've indicated. I recognize 
you essentially as stating that the State has 7,000 parcels 
of property that they need to look over; but I'm — I suppose 
- 1 1 -
1 I'm struggling to a certain extent with the fact that this 
2 particular parcel has been operated now, as I indicated, for 
3 close to 75 years; and the State is now claiming we had no 
4 idea that this property was being held under this tax sale, 
5 or under this claim of ownership until 2004. I mean, is that, 
6 in reality, what the State is arguing today? 
7 MR. MITCHELL: The State is arguing that, as alleged in 
8 its compiaint, it received — it became aware of the Mathis' 
9 claim for the advent of the attempt by the Mathis' to lease the 
10 coal, and it brought its action thereafter. 
11 There's no evidence before the Court, or argued, that 
12 the State had — that the trust had any actual knowledge of the 
13 tax sale, cr the status of what was in the County records, or 
14 'who was physically on the land. Again, 7,COO acres, a handful 
15 of people. 
16 You knew, if you think back to the original concept of 
17 why you can't adversely possess the sovereign, the theory was 
18 that the king owns everything, and the king is out doing what 
19 the king does, defending the borders, administrating the law, 
20 providing for the public welfare; and that if the king turns 
21 his back en this property, and others occupy it, we don't want 
22 the king spending his time looking behind his back to see if 
23 somebody else is on his property. That he cannot — the king 
24 — in this case the sovereign -- in this case, even more to the 
25 point, the trust, which the Legislature has sworn to protect, 
26 that because you turn your back en one piece of property among 
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thousands, that the presence of another under a quit claim deed 
— and there's no notice — there's no evidence that the trust 
received any notice prior to this coal case, that it was being 
claimed adversely. That this was the same parcel of land which 
had been through the adjudication, which had been the subject 
of the State auditor and the Governor's reports, that a quit 
claim deed had issued sometime in the heart of the depression, 
and that thereafter the Kathis' had been using it for ranching 
purposes. 
It wasn't until the coalies, 'which brcug.it it to a 
higher level of attention, came about, that it was brought to 
the attention of trust. In truth, it was at that point that 
the real value of the trust was challenged. Yes, the trust had 
lost the grazing fees on the land during those period of time; 
but this was the first time something of real value of the 
trust was being overtly challenged with the mining of this 
coal. 
So not only was there no actual laches in the sense 
of, "Oh, yeah, we know this is going on, and we just can't get 
around to it," but even if such was the case, "Oh, yeah, we 
know this is going on, but we've got — we're just so busy vie 
can't get around to it," laches would not act to divest the 
State of title. So, again, this is not a true tax sale case. 
This is a void sale. 
Secondly, then, VanWagoner, I think, is expressly 
clear on what the values are that are weighed here; and how 
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constitutionally tne Court judges what "he Legislature 
intended. It doesn't go out of its way to find the statute 
unconstitutional. It can construe a statute constitutionally, 
it will do so; and it did so in this instance by finding that 
the Legislature did not intend this to apply :o this plaintiff 
when seeking to recover its property. 
So I really — I believe this case can be decided, can 
be disposed of with the finding that if tax prop — if State 
property, it wasn't subject to a tax sale. If subject to this 
express — if this statute would otherwise appJy on its face, 
it cannot be applied as to this plaintiff, as to this group of 
lands. We think that there's really no ambiguity that this 
statute is addressed by VanWagoner as to this — as to this 
land and as to this claim. 
Does that — is that — are there still — 
THE COURT: One other question, if I might ask — and 
I don't want to get into the whole argument yet with respect to 
the after acquired title, but just assuming for the sake of 
argument at this juncture, because I'm focusing again on your 
statement that the tax sale really was invalid ab initio; and 
you're essentially suggesting that that was never a valid sale. 
If, just for the sake of argument right now, before 
we get into that, we were to assume that — and I'm not making 
that assumption, okay? — but if we were to assume that the 
After Acquired Title Statute applied in this case, then 
wouldn't the tax sale have been a valid sale? 
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MR. MITCHELL: Absolutely, if after acquired title, 
property never — we never got it. It just is — or. 1927, 
this land lept into Carbon County. Carbon County held the 
land, free, clear. State had no interest. There was something 
for the County tc tax. County taxed it. The sale was proper. 
There was nothing to challenge about the tax sale. Then it's a 
tax sale case; no question about it. 
To find out whether such is the case or not, to find 
out the answer to that, you have to provide the trust the 
opportunity to address that issue. VanWagoner says, "We don't 
— we won't let this statute be construed in such a way that 
the trust can't even get in the door, because the passage of 
time, where there's been a quit claim deed and a tax sale 
out of the County, tne passage of time is sufficient to bar 
the trust, who the Legislature constitutionally is bound to 
protect, we will not construe or impute to the Legislature the 
intend to do so. 
Sc I believe even if, cf course, if you find the 
other, I — you know, we have a oig problem; but you can't 
even 
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MR. RUSSELL: Thank you, your Honor. It's a pleasure 
to be out here. I — whoops, excuse me. I've been in front 
of Jucge Haliiday many times; and it's nice to meet you this 
morning. I haven't had that pleasure before, but it's good 
to meet you. It's nice to see, as well, that you've taken 
obviously a lot of rime to review the materials, and take a 
look at the case. 
You know, the first thing that struck me about this 
case — and perhaps it's why you're focusing on the statute 
of limitations first — is just the inherent injustice of 
the facts that come forward. It's like we've got a piece 
of property that's been in the family for all these years, 
suddenly when there's an opportunity that's presented by a 
lease, where the family can now finally make some money off 
their land, the State swoops in and tries to take it ail away. 
So we initially looked at that question, and I think 
— and certainly we submit that the statute of limitations is 
dispositive of the case; and the other issues are there, and I 
think car. be dispositive as well, but you don't even really 
need to reach them because of the way the statue of limitations 
would operate. 
I think the Court reallv hits the nail on the head 
when you say the 
it was 
VanWagoner case, wasn't 
an adverse possession case? It is 
because of that. 
family adversely 
We're not claiming here 
possessed this property. 
it different because 
clearly different 
that the Mathis 
That would be a 
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1 different case, and we recognize that there would be a 
2 constitutional issue with that if we were making it. So 
3 we've never made that claim. 
4 The issue is a little different than that, there are 
5 two statute of limitations really at play here. The first 
6 — one is the tax title statute of limitations, and as I 
7 understand what Mr. Mitchell just said, the State's not 
8 challenging the procedure utilized in the sale and so on. The 
9 reason you have a four year tax title statute of limitations 
10 is because of that. It's too late to come back and try to say 
11 that what the County did or didn't do in the sales process was 
12 defective, but — and that statute ran four years after 1931. 
13 So that one's around; there's no question about that. 
14 You still, then — so you get back, then, to the other 
15 statute of limitations, which is 78-12-2, which is entitled, 
16 "Actions by the State." Says, "The State will not sue any 
17 person for and respect to any real property or the issues of 
18 profits thereof by reason of tiie right or title of the State, 
19 the same — " okay, now this is not an adverse possession 
20 statute — "unless one such right or title shall accrue within 
21 seven years before any action or other proceeding for the same 
22 shall be commenced." 
23 Now, the State asserts that it obtained title under 
24 the Taylor Act — or the, excuse me, the Jones Axt in 1927. 
25 Seven years was run a long time — or after that. What's 
26 interesting is, is that the VanWagoner decision was directly 
-17-
1 addressed by rhe Court in the subsequent Trail Mountain case. 
2 I just wanted to read this quote, because it's — in 
3 the Court of Appeals decision in Trail Mountain says that "A 
4 plain reading of the statute reveals — " and we're talking 
5 about the same statute — "that it applies to actions brought 
6 by the State as a consequence of the State's claim of right to 
7 real property or issues of profits derived therefrom." 
8 On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court — well, it cited to 
9 the proposition, VanWagoner, the states are generally exempt 
10 from the applicable statute of limitations when acting in their 
11 capacity as a scnool, land trusties, but specifically refused 
12 to adopt that holding; and in fact found that for the seven 
13 year period in question, that the statute of limitations does 
14 apply. The Court didn't simply refuse to hear the arguments 
15 because they weren't brought up in time; but in fact, the 
16 merits were reached. 
17 In the Pine — Pioneer Investments and Trust, an oia 
18 1909 Supreme Court case that we've cited as well, the Court 
19 held that, quote, "This section — " the one we're talking 
20 about — "in substance provides that the State is barred from 
21 bringing an action for the recovery of real property claimed by 
22 it, unless such action is commenced with seven year — within 
23 seven years." 
24 Now, in this case, we're not dealing with the situation 
25 you had in VanWagcner where you had one party that had received 
26 a conveyance frcm the State, another party that was claiming by 
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adverse possession, challenging the conveyance that had been 
made by the State to someone else. 
This is a situation where the predecessor in interest 
-- the predecessor in title, the Carbon County Land Company, 
received a patent. They received the patent in 1912. We'll 
get into that — that whole sequence a little bit more, but 
certainly in 1927, by operation of the Doctrine of After 
Acquired Title, title vests. 
At that point in time, is when a cause of action by 
the State arose. If -- it wanted to say that after acquired 
title doesn't work here. If after acquired title is not going 
to be utilized -- and we're not going to recognize that; and 
yes, in fact, the State claims that it owns these sections that 
were conveyed by patent, without mineral or reservation, prior 
to 1919, is the relevant date, and we'll — again, we can get 
into that — it should have and could have brought a quiet 
title action then, and it chose not to. 
It's simply stated, our — simply stated, our position 
is that it's too late now for the Court — or for the State of 
Utah, the Trust Lands Division, to go back now and say, "Oh, 
well, we're now going to challenge our own conveyance of this 
property." The statute plainly states that the State cannot do 
that. It states that the time period has run. 
Again, I think simply stated, our position is this is 
not an adverse possession case. This is a case brought by the 
State challenging its own conveyance of real property that 
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occurred a long, long time ago. That: conveyance or property to 
Carbon County Land Company ultimately resulted in a tax sale of 
that very land; but it is the conveyance itself that the State 
made that it is net in a position at this time to challenge 
because of the operation of the statute of limitations. 
So the VanWagoner case I think is easily distinguished 
because it's an adverse possession case; and the Trail Mountain 
Coal Company vs. Utah Divisions of Lands and Forestry case 
makes it clear that the statutes that the Legislature says 
apply to the State, do apply to the State. 
Just quickly, the other provision, 78-12-33, is sort 
of tne catch all at the end of the limitations sections. If 
there's any question again about whether it was intended by 
the Legislature that the State be precluded from challenging 
its own conveyance — net an adverse possession claim, but by 
challenging its own conveyance, says, "Limitations in this 
article apply to actions brought in the name of, or for the 
benefit of the State or other governmental entity, the same 
as to actions by private parties," except under one section, 
which are asbestos claims, who have no bearing on the case 
before this Court. 
So that's, simply stated, our position. I think when 
you cut down to the chase, that's what you get back to, is can 
the State, at this point in time, challenge the conveyance that 
it made back in 1912; aud that the statute of limitations has 
run on that. 
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THE COURT: Thank ycu. 
MR. MITCHELL: May I briefly respond? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, the defendants have muddied 
a couple of very important points. First in point they've 
muddied is, they talked about the State as though the State 
is monolithic. There's no question the statute of limitations 
applies to the State. The question is, does the statute of 
limitations apply for this particular plaintiff, the trust. 
The Supreme Court held in VanWagoner at page 679, "The 
Constitution declares that such lands shall be held in trust — 
" the trust lands — "shall be held in trust for the people to 
be disposed of as may be provided by law for their respective 
purposes for which they have been or may be granted," quote, 
end quote. 
We emphasize the language just quoted and stated that 
it was an, quote, "absolute limitation upon the power of the 
State to dispose of such lands, or permit them to be cisposed 
of except for the purposes for which they were granted by 
Congress." We reaffirm what was there stated; but we find no 
reason to change our opinion. 
Then down at the next paragraph, "With this explanation 
there ought not longer to be any doubt as to the grounds." Now, 
nowhere in this opinion does the Court say this is a adverse 
possession case, and our reasoning, our logic, our moral 
prohibition is limited to adverse possession cases. 
-21-
1 Also, remember, of course, as of the time this case 
2 was decideo, tax titles were still very frail things. They 
3 were constantly being assaulted for formality issues. Remember, 
4 the purpose of this statute was to stop the attack upon the 
5 procedural problems, which invariably arose in tax titles. It 
6 is limited to a specific class of problems; tax titles, and the 
7 procedures by which they were gained. 
8 The Court gees on, "Believing as we did, that by 
9 the enabling act, the State was morally ocund because of the, 
10 quote, "Sacred obligation imposed upon its public faith," end 
11 quote, and believing also that by the provisions of the State 
12 Constitution was not only morally, but legally, bound to see 
13 that these lands or the proceeds there were devoted to school 
14 purposes, the Court was of the opinion the statute of 
15 limitations had no applications to the case. 
16 There's nothing about adverse possession that's 
17 relevant to that logic. It's — the fact that — and that 
18 case was adverse possession adds nothing to the proposition 
19 about what the ability, what the capacity of the Court's — 
20 of the Legislature is wnen dealing with this class cf lands. 
21 Finally, the language quoted from the Supreme Court's 
22 Trail Mountain decision, where he says, "We disagree, a plain 
23 reading of the statute," if you lock in the paragraph above, 
24 what is it they disagree with? They disagree with, quote, 
25 "Specifically Trail Mountain asserts that the language," quote, 
2 6 "by reason of the right or title of the State to the same," end 
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quote, in 78-12-2, "limits the applicability of the statute 
to cases where the State sues for the right or title to reai 
property, it's an adverse possession suit." 
We disagree. It's disagreeing with Trail Mountain's 
argument where the Court of Appeal's about the six-year statute 
of limitation. That's what it's disagreeing about. It's 
saying, "f you apply this, it's the six year, not the four 
year." That's what that dispute is. 
It does not in any place — so it does not reach the 
merits of, is this a VanWagoner case? It says, "We're not 
going to address that," specifically. It does not overrule 
VanWagoner. VanWagoner is still the controlling precedent 
before tnis Court. The underlying purposes of VanWagoner are 
still as applicable today as they were when they were first 
written. 
THE COURT: Well, let's focus on that for just a 
moment; and let me throw out a hypothetical to you, and perhaps 
— I'm not trying to suggest that is this case, but I'm trying 
to extend the logic of what you've just suggested to me that 
VanWagoner stands for. 
Let's presume that the VanWagoner case has indicated 
that the State car. always go back to recover property. It can 
always do that; and that's what it stand for the premise for. 
What if we had a situation as — similar to what the defendants 
in this case are alleging, but let's assume that we had a 
situation where the State had deeded property, and let's 
-23-
1 presume that we don't have the Sweet decision, and we don't 
2 have all the fallout from that, but the State just deeds the 
3 property out. Shouldn't have done it under the terms of the 
4 Federal grant, but they do it. 
5 State just deeds tne property out, and somebody buys 
6 the property, they use the property, they have the property. 
7 Are you suggesting that the VanWagoner case stands for the 
8 proposition that it doesn't matter that they would have done 
9 that. What matters is the fact that it's school trust lands; 
10 and therefore the State, at any time, can go back and retrieve 
11 that property? 
12 MR. MITCHELL: No, I'm not arguing that, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Okay, and I realize that was a considerable 
14 extension of your argument — 
15 MR. MITCHELL: Right — 
16 THE COURT: -- but I want to — 
17 MR. MITCHELL: -- but that is the box the defendants 
18 are trying to put themselves in; and they're doing that by 
19 saying, "Well, there was this deed in the form of a patent," 
20 and that the Mathis' are entitled to the benefit of that 
21 patent. 
22 Well, one, without getting into the quit claim aspect 
23 of it, that's not true; and ever, more to the point, they have a 
24 separate chain of title. There is no bonafide purchaser, as is 
25 implicit in your example. There is no bonafide purchaser for 
26 value who intervenes in this case. This is a case where, if 
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you will, the Mathis' are a straydee, a stranger, a title that 
comes out of nowhere. 
THE COURT: Well, is that accurate? I mean, don't they 
get their — and doesn't this go back to what we discussed 
earlier? Don't they get their rights flowing from the original 
1912 conveyance to the CCLC? In other words, the CCLC, we have 
this conveyance coming in from — or through the patent; and 
isn't it the CCLC, then, that fails to pay their taxes under 
that, and — 
MR. MITCHELL: Only if, by operation of after acquired 
title, that CCLC held the property; but even then, even then, 
their title is a new and independent title. Tax title is not 
derivative of; it is a new and independent title whose basis 
begins with the tax sale. 
THE COURT: I suppose, my question, the reason why I'm 
focusing on that 1912 due deed isn't necessarily to adjudge 
whether or not there -was after acquired title, but to focus a 
little bit on the notice that would have been out there to the 
State. 
You've suggested today that the State would have no 
notice that there was being any claim to this property; and yet 
they have their own grant back in 1912. Then there's also, of 
course, the tax deed that occurred at the later date. That's 
what I'm struggling with, is this suggestion that the State has 
no notice, in light of the fact that we have these two deeds 
out there. 
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MR. MITCHELL: Well, you have the original patent; 
and it was that patent which was the notice tot he Federal 
Government to bring CCLC into Court, into the Administrative 
Court, and to adjudicate whether at the time the State 
purported to sell it — or ever, nore to the point, at the 
time the State would have acquired title, the property was 
known mineral in nature. 
The party who received the patent from the State of 
Utah, was present, had the opportunity to be heard, present 
evidence, make argument, call witnesses, and contest this 
underlying fact as to the validity of the patent, because 
the validity of the patent is dependent upon whether or not 
the State of Utah received that (inaudible) under the enabling 
act. 
So as to the party who received the patent, they 
receive a title dependent upon whether or not the State of 
Utah had title to pass, and they were able to litigate that. 
They received a final appealable judgment. That judgment was 
not appealed; it became final. 
As of that point in time, both the State and Carbon 
County Land Company knew that title rested in the Federal 
government. Thereafter, the Jones Act, which was highly 
publicized, occurred. Did Carbon County make any noise, 
take any action, to say, "We're paying taxes because it's 
ours under after acquired title"? Is there a letter in the 
file saying, "As to this particular patent, after acquired 
-26-
1 title should pass to us from Carbon County Land Company"? None. 
2 Carbon County Land Company knew that their title had 
3 ceased. They ceased to pay taxes on a land in which they no 
4 longer had an interest. The County, understandably, with all 
5 the land they have, and particularly during the depression, 
6 all the lanes under back taxes roll, simply dealt with it as, 
7 the paper goes out, the taxes come in or they don't come in. 
8 If they don't come in, we have a tax sale. It's subject to 
9 redemption. Did anybody redeem? Nobody redeemed. It's 
10 availaole for the County to sell. 
11 Do they ask themselves, could this have been Jones Act 
12 land?" Of course they don't, understandably so. When we think 
13 about who had notice, we know that prior to the leases having 
14 been issued for the coal that's in dispute here, and the land 
15 that's in dispute here, that in 1964, pursuant to congressional 
16 action, to try and deal with the fact that you have all this 
17 land, which has been the subject of ail these State and Federal 
18 actions, which are dispositive as to their status, there's 
19 nonetheless, nothing filed in the counties where the lands 
20 reside. 
21 As a result of that, the United States started to 
22 issue its own patents. Finally, in 1964 -- and this is really, 
23 if you think back on it, part of that whole (inaudible) period 
24 of trying to clean up the records on the public lands — it 
25 finally issues the patent to the State of Utah for this land. 
26 What does that patent say? It says, "This land comes 
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to the State of Utah pursuant to the Act of January 1927," the 
Jones Act. It is recorded. As soon as the State receives it, 
it records it. It recorded thousands of these. Sent them our 
in bulk. We do know who did have actual notice of the adverse 
claim from 1964 on; and that was the Mathis'. 
They did not come to this Stare and say, "What is this 
patent under the Jones Act? What is this claim of title under 
rhe Jones Act you're filing from the United States Government?" 
So the State of Utah was not taking any action to lie in the 
bushes and wait to see if seme coal opportunity showed up. The 
State of Utah, as soon as it did become aware that tnere was a 
conflict, took action. 
There really is not an equitable basis. This is not a 
case where estoppel — there was a representation by the State 
to the Mathis' that the Mathis' relied on, because it was made 
to them and asked them to do something in reliance thereon. 
It's just the opposite. 
As of 1964, a statement was made on the public records 
as this land of the State of Utah did claim it, and claimed it 
under the 1927 Act. So it's a very different case than the 
sort of case that might otherwise trouble you, I think. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. There were a few items 
that were new that were raised, Mr. Russell. I'll let you do 
that, and then give Kr. Mitchell a final reply. 
MR. RUSSELL: A couple of items were raised, your 
Honor, that sort of touched on the rest of the case, but I 
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think are important to understand, because it: does bear on the 
statue of limitations. So if I might approach the oench? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. RUSSELL: I also created a handout. Some of these 
are a little bit duplicative of — I think of wnat Mr. Mitcnell 
gave you, but a couple letters here that are not. Let me start 
where he finisned. 
The patent that was issued in 1964 was a confirmatory 
patent, which is done routinely. It relates back. It's 
irrelevant, quite frankly. It's not an indication of the 
State claiming present ownership, it's a United States finally 
getting around to formally granting to the State the Lands that 
were passed either under the Enabling Act or under the Jones 
Act, 
Let me refer the Court, in this packet that I've just 
handed to you, you'll see a couple of letters. The first one 
is under Tab 3, which is a letter that's — that written in 
1929 — see, these are letters that are contemporaneous; and 
this is why the Statute of Limitations really has to apply 
here. This is not, again, a situation where we've got aaverse 
possession being claimed based on a period of time; but we have 
a conveyance that's been nade that has a legal effect that the 
Court — that the State chose not to challenge at the time. 
We've heard argument about notice, I'm not quite sure 
that that's relevant, but this is not a Bonfield purchaser 
case; this is not a — those issues really have nothing to do 
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with it. I thin* trie issues are before the Court. 
If you'll look at this letter, this is written Dy the 
State Land Beard of Utah, which is the predecessor to the 
present day SITLA, the State Institutional and Trust Lands --
THE COURT: And this is under tab 4; did you say? 
MR. RUSSELL: Tao No. 4, yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. RUSSELL: Ana I'm also puzzled by the notion that 
the State of Utan is not a party here, because that's what the 
complaint says. It's the State of Utah acting by and through 
the State Trust Lands Divisions. So it's a division cf the 
State of Utah. I believe that the statutes are clear that all 
of the limitations apply against the State of Utah and its 
agencies. 
Back to this letter, after the Jones Act was passed, 
the State Land Board — the State Land Board of Utah is now 
realizing that, well, wait a minute. The Jones Act says that, 
title to those sections that were of known mineral character, 
now vest 
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after — 
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was trying to prevent the states from conveying away state 
trust lands, for the benefit of the school children. 
So, anyway, back to this letter, this -- the State 
Land Board points out to the Commissioner in the General Land 
Office -- if you're iust above the quoted language, it says, 
"In 1919, our State Legislature, Chapter 107, Session laws of 
Utah, enacted a law requiring that all sales of State lands 
thereafter must contain a reservation of minerals by the State, 
providing for the lease of minerals. However, any sales made 
by the State prior to 1919 were not subject to a mineral 
reservation in the State.' 
Then he goes on tc quote the afer acquired title 
statutes. Says, ''After acquired title inures to prior grantees, 
if any person shall hereafter convey any real estate by 
conveyance, purporting to convey the same, a fee simple and 
absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance have 
legal estate and (inaudible) estate, but shall thereafter 
acquire the same. The legal estate subsequently acquired 
passes." 
So then he sets up the fact on the next page that the 
statute represents a legislative declaration of the Doctrine of 
Estoppel by D. In the next paragraph under the decision, this 
has been called to cur attention. "This doctrine appears to 
be binding upon States anc their transactions, as well as upon 
individuals. The result of the application of the doctrine, 
wouldn't ordinarily — " "would ordinarily, therefore, result in 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
-31-
the vesting in the States, prior grantee, any title, which the 
State of Utah acquired under the Act of January 25Ln, 1927, the 
Jones Act.' 
So then he asked the question, "Okay, well, what do we 
do now, because the Jones Act says we can't convey minerals. 
We've already issued these patents that do convey the minerals, 
but the Jones Act — how do we resolve this quandary?" That's 
what eno.ed up being resolved in the 1932 amendment, which we'll 
talk about. 
My point there is, the State knew in 1927 that after 
acquired title had occurred, that that created an issue with 
the minerals, and the mineral estate. If you look at the next 
letter in the sequence, which I've got under Tab 5, this again, 
this is a letter from the State geologist for the State Land 
Office; and these records are right out of the SITLA's files, A 
— E. H. Burto, who's writing now to the State Land Board, and 
they're asking him for his advise, "What do we do about these 
proper 
of the 
lands, 
after 
to the 
two re 
after 
ties that are : »n this 
The conveyances pr: 
mineral estate, that 
category?" 
Lor to 1919, without a reservation 
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1 "Under — " after describing after acquired title and the 
2 history and how we got to where we are with conveyances prior 
3 to 1919, he says, "I believe two courses of action are open to 
4 correct the situation." Do you see that? 
5 THE COURT: Yes. 
6 MR. RUSSELL: No. 1, "To endeavor a higher an act — " 
7 or "to have an act passed by Congress quieting title in the 
8 various states to all school mineral lands sold prior to the 
9 Act of January 25, 1927," That would be like this one. That's 
10 what they did; they ended up getting Congress to pass an Act. 
11 Then he talks about — he coesn't think that's 
12 possible. Congress probably won't do that, but in No. 2, then, 
13 he says, "For the State of Utah proceed with the classification 
14 of all school, section tracks as to mineral characteristic 
15 which was sold without mineral reservation to the State." 
16 Then he discusses the fact that you have to essentially bring 
17 quiet title actions on ail of these sections, 
18 So, the State of Utah knew about this. This — the 
19 trust land — or the State Land Board knew about this issue 
20 back at -- contemporaneous with the passage of the Jones Act, 
21 with the amendment that was done by Congress in 1932 to address 
22 this issue. 
23 The whole point of our argument about the Statute of 
24 Limitations is not that we've adversely possessed this property 
25 I since that point in time, which is, you can't get title by 
26 adverse possession, but the State conveyed this parcel. There 
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was a conveyance by patent that subsequentiy resulted in that 
party losing its interest by a tax sale, that then results in 
our chain of title, no question about that; but it is simply 
too late, the tinie period nas passed for the State to be 
cringing the actions, challenging its own conveyance of 
lands that occurred back in 1912 as then operation of an 
after acquired title in 1927 by the Jones Act. 
So this is not some -- a case where after acquired 
title applies. I think the Court — the example the Court 
gave hits the nail on the head, that if the statute were to 
be interpreted, the limitations period, as the State is now 
arguing, any conveyance made by the State of Utah of a trust 
land, would be subject to a challenge at any time, without 
limitation, because somebody in a different administration, 
10, or 15 or 20 or 100 years later, couid look back and say, 
"You know, there was fraud in that transaction," or "We aon't 
think that the purpose it was conveyed for was proper. It was 
used for something other than benefitting the school children. 
"The person got a better deal than he or she should have." 
That's why we have a limitations period. You need to 
have certainty in title so that people can get on with life, 
that they can understand the property has been conveyed, they 
can make valid use of the property; and there's a seven year 
period for the State that if it wanted to challenge some 
conveyance, it could have, and it didn't do it. That's our — 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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MR. MITCHELL: — rebuttal for that. 
THE COURT: Just for your information, Mr. Mitchell, 
I'm taking that argument against: focusing primarily on the 
notice issue that would have been to the State. In other 
words/ I'n not trying to get into ruling on the applicability 
of the Jones Act and after acquired title; but I'm focusing 
primarily on that rebuttal as notice to the State. 
MR. MITCHELL; I understanc tnat, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MITCHELL: That's why his characterization of that, 
I thin*, is misleading at best, and here's why. The letter of 
July 17th, 1929 by Mr. Oldroyd is not a position by the State of 
Utah. What it says is, "Under the doctrines which have been 
called to our attention — " Mr. Oldroyd, not appearing to be 
a lawyer, not saying — which would have been helpful if he 
really thought it was the case — that tnis is the opinion of 
our Attorney General, or the attached briefs, or the attached 
legal analysis. Rather, clearly someone got to him and said, 
"Send this letter," and he said, "You — you're the solicitor, 
you're the chief legal officer of the land for these issues. 
What do you think? We've been told we have a quandary here." 
Cf course, we knew what he said to that. He said, 
"Nonsense;" but even mere to the point, the real purpose in 
the letter comes down to the issue — and here's the important 
distinction to keep in mind. There's no question after the 
Jones Act there were a class cf lands whose status was unknown, 
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among those 
Interior — 
Interior, is 
ivhat you're suggesting? 
MR. MITCHELL: Because of the Department of Interior. 
No quiet title action was necessary. Title had been quieted in 
the United States. It was the United States to dispose of, as 
of that point in time. Everyone who had an interest in that 
land, everyone who had received a patent had been involved. 
It was litigated, it was acjudicated, it was final, it was res 
judicata. 
The issue in this case is, what happened afterwards? 
What happened when the Mat his' got a quit claim deed? Was 
there a tax sale or wasn't there a tax sale? Did the quit 
claim pass anything, or didn't it pass anything? Not whether 
there' s some 
County to se 
think, 
The 
does 
irregularity. 
11? 
verdict letter 
a good job of c; 
Of course, there would have 
these 
quiet 
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title 
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THE COURT: I tried to listen very carefully to the 
arguments that have been presented today; and I suspect that 
these are issues that are ultimately going to need to be sorted 
out through the Appellate Court, but T'ni going to give you rr.y 
best shot at it today. 
I see a significant difference in the VanWagoner 
case and the case before the Court. That difference nas to 
do with the nature of the proceeding. The VanWaccner case 
was an adverse title case, where tne parties had — I say 
"the parties" — where essentially the Khitmore in that case 
would had gone onto the property, and under no claim of title, 
no claim of any right whatsoever, had essentially adversely 
possessed it. There was no colcr of any right to be on the 
property. There was no deed of any type in that case, whereby 
the party, the Whitmcre party would have gone onto the property 
and held the land. 
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the Utah 
We have the 
We have the 
Then we have 
a tax deed, tax sale that occurs where the County essentially 
takes the property and sells it. 
Then we have the parties who purchased the property 
at the tax sale. Under the color of that 6ee6t staying on 
the property, using it, as acknowledged now by the State for 
grazing and ranching purposes for a period of 65 plus years, 
and the State has acknowledged today that we may have lost 
some grazing fees, we may have lost some grazing revenue, but 
essentially there has been continual occupancy on that property 
under the color of that deed. 
So I take a look at the statute of limitations, and I 
think this case is substantially different than that adverse 
possession claim, given the history of the titles in this case, 
given the history of what has occurred. 
Vie have the defendants in this case who've occupied 
that property under the color of title and under the tax deed, 
which flow from the 1912 patent. I recognize there's lots of 
disputes regarding that; but my point is, is that they are 
certainly on that property with a colorable interest, with 
color of title. I don't know if that's the appropriate 
language to use; but I'm simply suggesting there's a deed 
there that they're basing it upon. I see that as being a very 
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significant difference, and they're occupying it for a long 
period of time. 
So as a consequence I then take a look at the statute; 
and it appears to me that the language is fairly clear as it 
applies to the State. Section "78-12-2, "The State will not sue 
any person for or in respect to any real property or the issues 
or profits thereof by reason of the right or title of the State 
to the same, unless one, such right or title shall have accrued 
within seven years before any action or other proceeding for 
the same shall be commenced or to the State or those from whom 
a claim shall have received the rents and profits of such real 
property or sozie part thereof within seven years." 
I don't seen how those criteria have been satisfied 
in this case. I am mindful of the Court of Appeals decision 
and the Supreme Court's decision upholding this portion of the 
Court of Appeals judgment. I'm also mindful of footnote 11 in 
the Court — Supreme Court's decision that indicates it wasn't 
fully briefed; and I recognize the State's claim with respect 
to that. 
I believe when I take a look at the language in the 
Court of Appeals decision, where they state as follows, "It 
is true that States are generally exempt from the applicable 
statute of limitations when acting in their capacity of School 
Land Trust State." So they throve that out; but then they come 
along and, even though they quoted the VanWagoner decision, 
26 they stayed. "However, and exception to the general rule is 
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ices 
State of Utah within the applicable statute of limitation, 
Then the case goes on to quote those two provisions that I 
just read. The Court of Appeals goes on to state, "As if 
this section did not sufficiently indicate the Legislature's 
intent to include the State within the statute of limitations." 
Another section provides that, "The limitations in 
this article apply to actions brought in the name of, or for 
the benefit of the State or other Governmental entity, the 
same as to actions by private parties." That's, of course, 
the statute that Mr. Russell referred me to a fev; moments ago. 
Then, the Court of Appeals concludes, "Given the 
statutory scheme, we can only conclude that the Legislature 
intended to subject the State to the applicable statute of 
limitations." I think that is language that I believe is most 
appropriate to this case, given the history and the facts of 
— as to what has occurred, given the fact that there was the 
colorable claim of right through the tax deed, and perhaps even 
flowing back to the 1912 deed or patent — I keep referring to 
it as 
think 
of occ 
acknow 
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the rents from grazing cr something from the grazing rights 
associated wirh chat further cuts against the State, because 
the State is essentially suggesting today that we have lost 
out for a period of 65 years on these grazing rights that would 
have been associated with the lane; and if they would have lost 
out on that, if they nave lost those rights, then we're simply 
talking about a question of magnitude in this case. Whether or 
not we're talking about grazing rights or mineral rights, the 
legal principle should be the same. 
So based upon all of those facts, it's my best shot 
today that the statute of limitations does apply as a bar to 
the State's action to recover the property from the defendants 
in this case; and accordingly, I'm going to deny the State's 
motion for summary judgment. 
I suppose I'm granting the defendant's motion for 
summary judgement, only to the extent that it applies to the 
State's claim. In other words, I'm not suggesting that there's 
quiet title as opposed to the whole world, because the whole 
world doesn't have notice in this case; but as to the State's 
claim, in this case. 
I think that's probably the best way to frame that 
to allow you to get before the appropriate — this is an issue 
that probably needs to be addressed and solved by the appellate 
Courts, and I acknowledge that. 
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. We appreciate 
it. We know you worked hard en this. We appreciate your 
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summary 
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that can br 
for 
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an appeal — 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. MITCHELL: -- even though other issues remain? 
THE COURT: Well, let's talk about what those other 
issues would be. What is it that I'm not — 
MR. RUSSELL: I think tnat that disposes of all of 
the claims in the case. There is a fund of money that has 
accrued that the parties have placed in an escrow pending 
the resolution of this outcome. By ruling in favor of the 
Defendants, obviously that fund of money's available, unless 
something else is either agreed upon, or — I don't know -- if 
an appropriate motion is made that that money not be released. 
That's not before the 
order, hopefully, and 
THE COURT: I 
Court today. 
have Mr. — 
was going to 
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MR. RUSSELL: The effect of the Court's order is tc 
dispose of the case — 
THS COURT: Yeah. 
MR. RUSSSLL: — and I'll prepare an order that 
accomplishes that. It should be a final order so that this 
appealable — 
THE COURT: And that's -- I had intended it to be 
just that. Z just was uncertain as to what issues 1 was not 
disposing of in the case. 
MR. MITCHELL: Well, I agree in part with Mr. Russell. 
I believe it's a final orcer for the purposes of appeal. As 
a practical matter, it is incumbent upon us tc seek further 
order with regard to the funds in escrow. That is correct; 
but the order should reflect that not having — the appealing 
that this matter was dispositive, should reflect tnat all — 
that no other issues were addressed in the process — 
THE COURT: That's correct. 
MR. MITCHELL: — and that this was in the — 
THE COURT: In other words — and here's something that 
I think is very important. You have raised in your briefs a 
variety of issues that I did not reach. I'm not trying to 
suggest today, that I believe the Court of Appeals couldn't 
reach those; and I don't believe anyone would t.nink that the 
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court — which ever appellate 
body were to handle this case on an appeal — would net be able 
to consider all of your arguments that are contained in the 
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have 
aised 
THE COURT: So if that's your question — 
MR. MITCHELL: Well --
THE COURT: — Mr. Mitchell, then I think you've 
preserved those issues — 
MR. MITCHELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- to argue them on appeal, if that's what 
you're suggesting. 
MR. MITCHELL: I simply want the record clear that 
whether the Appellate Court determines that they can decide, 
as a matter of law, those matters, that they rule in our favor 
on the other; or whether they return it to this Court for 
further proceedings, that these issues were not disposed of 
oy you toaay. You do net need to reach them to reach this — 
you do not reach them reaching this --
THE COURT: Correct, correct. In other words, I relied 
on the statute of limitations as the basis. 
MR. MITCHELL: Right. 
THE COURT: There's no question about that; and that's 
the basis that I'm reJying upon for my decision today. I'm not 
getting to those other issues, you're accurate. 
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: For reasons of, I suppose, judicial 
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restraint, I don't see any reason why I need to reach those 
issue and rr.ake comment on then, when I'm using the statute of 
limitations as the basis for ray ruling today. 
MR. MITCHELL; I understand that. 
MR. RUSSELL: And I understand that, and I will make 
the order reflect that the Court's decision is based on the 
statute of limitations — 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. RUSSELL: — and the Court did not, as a result, 
reach those other issues — 
THE COURT: Correct, tnat's accurate. That's accurate. 
MR. RUSSELL: — that were raised; and that doesn't 
preclude either party from raising an appeal that the Court 
should have — 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. RUSSELL: — granted the motion on the other 
grounds. 
other 
case. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: Correct. 
RUSSELL; Certainly r or should no 
grounds, as the case may be. 
I 
together 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
t have, 
COURT: Correct. Exactly. All right. 
RUSSELL: Thank you 
MITCHELL: Thank yo* 
COURT: Thank you. 
appreciate the efforts 
. It ' s been very, very 
r your Honor, 
j, your Honor. 
Well argued, 
of Counsel in 
helpful as I' 
v/eli pr 
puttin' 
ve gone 
on the 
esented 
g this 
through. 
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I know 
togethe 
that you've wor 
r, and I apprec 
being here today. 
MR. RUSSELL: 
MR. MITCHELL: 
THE CLERK: Ai 
{Hearing cone 
ked very, 
iate your 
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Thank you 
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